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Michael Kepl had a secret family.' For nearly ten years, Kepl car-
ried on an extramarital affair with his former coworker, Teresa Brock.2 A
few years into their relationship, KepI and Brock began actively trying to
conceive a child together.3 When sexual intercourse failed to result in
pregnancy, Brock enlisted the help of doctors and fertility clinics in Ta-
coma and Seattle. 4 Several artificial insemination procedures 5 using
sperm provided by Kepl were unsuccessful.6 Finally, the couple was able
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1. The following factual scenario is taken from In re Parentage ofJM., and D.R.K., 155
Wash. 2d 374, 119 P.3d 840 (2005).
2. Id. at 378, 119 P.3d at 842. Kepl was married to another woman, with whom he had a
daughter in 1991. Id
3. Id
4. Id.
5. "Artificial insemination is defined as the introduction of semen into the vagina other than by
coitus." Id at 379 n.2, 119 P.3d 842-43 (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 906 (27th ed.
2000)) (internal quotations omitted).
6. Id. at 378, 119 P.3d at 842.
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to conceive via in vitro fertilization 7 using preembryos 8 created from
Kepl's sperm and Brock's eggs.9
In 1998, Brock gave birth to their first son, John.' 0 Kepl was the
first person other than the hospital staff to hold John." Kepl gave Brock
flowers and cards, which included messages of "It's a Boy-Finally!"
and "Bunches of love to you and our bundle of joy."' 2 After the birth,
Kepl signed a paternity affidavit.' 3 He referred to himself as John's
"Dad."' 14 He visited John every week, took Brock and John on vacation,
participated in holiday events, and attended John's birthday parties. 15 He
also paid monthly child support payments and took out a $100,000 life
insurance policy, which identified John as his son and primary benefici-
ary, and which identified Brock as his significant other and contingent
beneficiary. 6 In 2002, Brock gave birth to Kepl's second son, David,
who was also conceived using in vitro fertilization.'
7
A few months after David's birth, however, Kepl's wife found out
about his "other family."'18 Suddenly, Kepl cut off all financial and emo-
tional support to John and David and adamantly denied that he was their
father.' 9 Abandoned by Kepl, Brock struggled financially to support the
children by herself20 In 2002, she filed a petition to establish Kepl's par-
7. "In vitro fertilization is a process whereby (usually multiple) ova are placed in a medium to
which sperm are added for fertilization, the zygote thus produced being introduced into the uterus
and allowed to develop to term." Id. at 379 n.2, 119 P.3d at 842-43 (internal citations and quota-
tions omitted).
8. A Washington court has defined "preembryo" as follows:
The term "preembryo" denotes that stage in human development immediately after fer-
tilization occurs. The preembryo comes into existence with the first cell division and lasts
until the appearance of a single primitive streak, which is the first sign of organ differen-
tiation. This primitive streak occurs at about fourteen days of development.
Litowitz v. Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d 514, 516 n.2, 48 P.3d 261, 262 (2002) (internal quotations and
alterations omitted) (citing, inter alia, Clifford Grobstein, Human Development from Fertilization to
Birth, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 847 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995)).
9. JMK., 155 Wash. 2d at 378, 119 P.3d at 842.




13. Id. The legal consequences of signing a paternity affidavit are discussed infra notes 90-92
and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 380, 119 P.3d at 843.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 381, 119 P.3d at 843-44; Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 4, J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d
374 (No. 75563-9).
19. J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d at 381-82, 119 P.3d at 843-44; Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 4,
J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d 374 (No. 75563-9).
20. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 4, J.M.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374 (No. 75563-9).
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entage of John and David and requested that Kepl be required to resume
child support payments.21
Following a protracted paternity battle, the Washington Supreme
Court recently held that under Washington's former Parentage Act (the
former WPA)22 Kepi was the legal father 23 of John and David and had a
financial duty to support them.24 Ironically, if Brock had filed her peti-
tion to establish paternity just four months later-after Washington's
current Uniform Parentage Act (the WPA) went into effect 2 5-the court
could not have easily arrived at this same conclusion, solely because
Brock and Kepl were not a married couple.26
The difficulty in reaching the same holding under the WPA is one
of several indications that the Act is a step backward for the rights of
nonmarital children. 27 Although the WPA proclaims that there is "[n]o
21. JMK., 155 Wash. 2d at 381, 119 P.3d at 843-44.
22. Washington's parentage provisions are contained in Chapter 26.26 of the Revised Code of
Washington (RCW), the Uniform Parentage Act. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.011-.913 (2004).
In 2002, the Washington legislature repealed the existing provisions of Chapter 26.26 and enacted an
updated version of the Act. See Second Substitute H.B. 2346, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002),
2002 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 302, § 711; see also infra Part I1.A. In this Comment, Washington's
Uniform Parentage Acts are referred to as the Washington Parentage Acts in order to avoid possible
confusion between the Uniform Parentage Acts enacted by Washington and the Uniform Parentage
Acts promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL"). See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the relationship between these different acts
and the function of NCCUSL. Only the parentage acts promulgated by NCCUSL will be referred to
as Uniform Parentage Acts.
23. Legal parenthood entails both rights and responsibilities. Washington courts have recog-
nized that the rights of the child, the parents, and the state are all at stake in parentage actions and
have stated that the rights of the child should be weighed most heavily:
The child has an interest not only in obtaining support, but also in inheritance rights, fam-
ily bonds, and accurate identification of his or her parents. The putative parent has an in-
terest in family bonds and in not being erroneously required to pay child support. The
parent also has a recognized right to the companionship, care, and custody of his or her
minor children of which he or she cannot be deprived without due process of law. Fi-
nally, the State has an interest in protecting the public from the burden of supporting chil-
dren born out of wedlock and in accurately determining who should pay support. Where
these rights come into conflict, the rights of the child should prevail.
McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 311, 738 P.2d 254, 261-62 (1987) (internal citations
omitted).
24. .JMK., 155 Wash. 2d at 377, 394, 119 P.2d at 841-42.
25. Because Brock commenced her parentage proceeding on February 20, 2002, the former
WPA was applicable. Id. at 378 n.I, 119 P.3d at 842. The WPA took effect on June 13, 2002. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.904 (2004) ("A proceeding to adjudicate parentage which was com-
menced before June 13, 2002, is governed by the law in effect at the time the proceeding was com-
menced.").
26. See infra Part II.B-C.
27. Children born to unmarried parents are referred to in this Comment as "nonmarital" chil-
dren, while children born to married parents are referred to as "marital" children. This terminology is
employed in order to avoid the negative connotation associated with the term "illegitimate." See
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legis-
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discrimination based on marital status, ' 28 the Act treats nonmarital chil-
dren disfavorably as compared to marital children.29 This differential
treatment is most apparent in Washington's statutes governing the par-
entage of children conceived using assisted reproductive technology
(ART). 30 For example, under the current WPA, Kepi could have walked
away from his second family without ever paying a dime in child sup-
port.3' This Comment argues that Washington should amend the WPA to
protect the rights of nonmarital ART children.
32
Although an analysis of the legal issues surrounding the determina-
tion of parentage for nonmarital ART children in Washington might ap-
pear to be merely academic, surprising statistics about the number of
nonmarital births and the rapidly increasing usage of ART in the United
States should caution one to think twice before dismissing the legal
needs of nonmarital ART children. Approximately one-third of all chil-
dren born in the U.S. each year are born to unmarried parents.3 3 Census
2000 revealed that over ten percent of all coupled households in Wash-
ington are unmarried-partner households and close to forty percent of
these households have children.34 In addition, since ART first came into
lative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 53 n.228 (1975) (suggesting that the term "nonmarital" be
used to describe children born out-of-wedlock for this reason).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.106 (2004) (in caption). Captions are not technically part of the
law. Id. § 26.26.913.
29. See infra Part Il.
30. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.705-.740 (2004); see infra Part lIl. As defined in the
definitional section of Chapter 26.26, "'assisted reproduction' means a method of causing pregnancy
other than sexual intercourse." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.011(4) (2004). The term includes artifi-
cial insemination, egg donation, embryo donation, in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, and
intracytoplasmic sperm injection. Id.
31. See infra Part 1lI.B-C.
32. This Comment focuses on obstacles to establishing legal paternity for the biological chil-
dren of unmarried heterosexual couples who utilize ART in order to conceive. It does not attempt to
address the many complicated issues raised by surrogacy agreements; however, Washington's surro-
gacy statutes are briefly discussed infra note 55. Finally, this Comment does not attempt to address
the myriad issues surrounding the use of ART by gay and lesbian couples, except to the extent that
concerns about non-traditional families may have influenced the drafters of the WPA. See infra
notes 183-195 and accompanying text.
33. See TALLESE JOHNSON & JANE DYE, INDICATORS OF MARRIAGE AND FERTILITY IN THE
UNITED STATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2000 To 2003 (May 2005), available
at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/fertility/mar-fert-slides.html (between 2000 and
2003, twenty-nine percent of U.S. women who had given birth in the last year were unmarried).
34. See TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-
PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS 4 tbl.2 (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf. Opposite-sex unmarried partner households
constitute 9.4% of all coupled households in Washington, while same-sex unmarried partners consti-
tute 1.2% of coupled households. Id. 45.8% of married-couple households in Washington have bio-
logical children. Id. at 9 tbl.4. 35.1% of opposite-sex unmarried-partner households have biological
children, and 39.7% have biological and/or unrelated children. Id.
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widespread use in the 1950's, 35 its popularity and usage has skyrock-
eted. 36 There are over 400 ART clinics in the U.S., 37 nine of which were
located in Washington as of 2003.38 All of these Washington fertility
clinics offer services to unmarried women. 39 Nationally, more than 1.2
million women have infertility-related medical appointments each year,40
and there are at least one hundred thousand ART children born every
year.4' Because the number of nonmarital ART children born each year
will only increase,4 2 Washington must provide clear, practical, and fair
laws governing the parentage of these children.
Nearly thirty years ago, a Washington commentator hailed the en-
actment of the former WPA as a step forward for the rights of nonmarital
children:
Washington's adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act is a signifi-
cant step forward in the long struggle toward equal protection for il-
legitimate children. Attaining legal rights equal to those of children
born of legally married parents is but a step in the direction of soci-
ety's recognition of illegitimate children as just children. And the
erasure of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate chil-
35. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 845 (2000) (noting that artificial in-
semination is the oldest and most popular means of ART and that it first came into widespread use
during the 1950's).
36. See Lori B. Andrews, Reproductive Technology Comes of Age, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 375,
377 (1999) (noting that the ART industry receives billions of dollars in annual revenues and serves
one in six American couples who are infertile).
37. See U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, 2003 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY
AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 13 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2003
[hereinafter 2003 ART SUCCESS RATES].
38. See 2003 ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 37, at 459-67.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 3.
41. The exact number of ART children bom each year is difficult to determine because the
annual ART success report published by the Center for Disease Control only includes statistics for
ART procedures in which both eggs and sperm are handled; the report does not include birth statis-
tics for children conceived through artificial insemination. See 2003 ART SUCCESS RATES, supra
note 37, at 3. Between 1996 and 2003, the number of children bom using ART procedures other than
artificial insemination doubled: in 1996, 20,840 children were bom, and in 2003, 48,746 children
were born. See id. at 55. In 1999, the number of children conceived annually through artificial in-
semination alone was estimated to be approximately 60,000. See Andrews, supra note 36, at 377.
Combined, these numbers indicate that the number of ART children born in the U.S. each year is
well over one hundred thousand children.
42. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 638 (2002).
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dren should aid society in its acceptance of the equal status of all
children.
43
Unfortunately, the revised WPA has not stayed true to its original
purpose. Although the former WPA was less than perfect in its treatment
of nonmarital ART children,4 the current WPA is a giant step backward
for the rights of nonmarital children. The WPA removed existing protec-
tions for nonmarital children and bars the biological father of a nonmari-
tal ART child from being established as the child's legal father under
Washington's parentage statutes. 45 The WPA should be amended be-
cause, at the very least, these provisions constitute bad public policy,
46
and, at the worst, they are unconstitutional.47
The purpose of this Comment is to encourage the Washington legis-
lature to amend the WPA and to suggest potential avenues for
challenging the Act if it is not amended. Part II of this Comment pro-
vides the historical and legal context necessary to analyze and critique
the WPA. Part III discusses the WPA's serious shortcomings and ex-
plores one potential constitutional challenge to the Act. Part IV contains
recommendations for amending the WPA.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
This Part begins with an overview of the various Parentage Acts
that are discussed in this Comment. It continues with a brief description
of the legal status of nonmarital children prior to the enactment of the
former WPA. Finally, in order to provide a baseline for the analysis and
critique of the current WPA, this Part explains the history and purpose
behind the former WPA, discusses several of the former WPA's key pro-
visions concerning the parentage of nonmarital children, and uses the
recent Washington Supreme Court case, In re J.MK & D.R.K.,48 to
illustrate the imperfection of the former WPA's artificial insemination
statute.
43. Sheila A. Malloy, Comment, Washington's Parentage Act: A Step Forward for Children's
Rights, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 455, 466 (1977). See infra Part II.C for a detailed discussion of the history
and purpose of the former WPA.
44. See infra Part II.E.
45. See infra Part 1II.B-D.
46. See infra Part III.E.
47. See infra Part III.F.
48. 155 Wash. 2d 374, 119 P.3d 840 (2005). The facts of this case were discussed in the Intro-
duction.
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A. An Introduction to the Uniform and Washington Parentage Acts
The former WPA was enacted in 1976. 49 The Act was based on the
official text of the Uniform Parentage Act promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 50 in
1973 (UPA (1973))." In 2000, NCCUSL promulgated a revised
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA (2000)) and withdrew UPA (1973).52 Due
to criticism of UPA (2000), NCCUSL promulgated a newly amended
Uniform Parentage Act in 2002 (UPA (2002)). 3 The current WPA is
based on the official text of UPA (2000) and does not contain any of the
promulgated amendments of UPA (2002). 4 Washington also chose to
retain previously existing surrogacy laws 55 and did not enact UPA (2000)
Article 8, Gestational Agreement.56
When interpreting Washington's Parentage Acts, courts often look
for guidance to the official comments of the Uniform Parentage Acts
upon which the Washington Acts were based. 57 For this reason, the for-
mer WPA is discussed in conjunction with UPA (1973), and the current
WPA is discussed in conjunction with UPA (2000). Textual deviations
between the Washington and Uniform Acts are specifically noted only
where relevant.
49. See 1975-76 Wash. Sess. Laws (2d Ex. Sess.) 1969.
50. NCCUSL drafts and proposes Uniform and Model Acts in areas of the law where uniform-
ity between the states is desirable. NCCUSL Web, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.
aspx?tabindex=0&tabid= I1 (last visited July 1, 2006).
51. See Second Substitute H.B. 2346, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002), 2002 Wash. Sess.
Laws ch. 302, § 711; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 386-505 (2001).
52. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 297 (2001).
53. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 2005); see
infra note 140 and accompanying text. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the 2002 amendments.
54. See Second Substitute H.B. 2346, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002), 2002 Wash. Sess.
Laws ch. 302, § 711; see also John J. Sampson, Preface to the Amendments to the Uniform Parent-
age Act (2002), 37 FAM. L.Q. 4 (2003) [hereinafter Sampson (2002)].
55. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210-.26.260 (2004). Surrogacy agreements for compensa-
tion are void as against public policy. See id. § 26.26.240. Surrogacy agreements are valid, however,
as long as the surrogate meets statutory eligibility requirements (the surrogate cannot be a minor and
cannot suffer from a developmental disorder, mental illness, or mental retardation), see id. §
26.26.220, and so long as the surrogate is compensated only for expenses incurred as a result of the
pregnancy, actual medical expenses, and reasonable attorney fees for the drafting of the contract. See
id §§ 26.26.210(1), .26.230, .26.240. Cf id. § 26.26.735 (Child of assisted reproduction-Effect of
agreement between ovum donor and woman who gives birth).
56. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210-.260 (2004); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 (amended
2002), 9B U.L.A. 360-370 (2001); Sampson (2002), supra note 54, at 4. Washington also declined
to enact Article 4, Registry of Paternity. Sampson (2002), supra note 54, at 4; see UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT art. 4 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 321-423 (2001).
57. See, e.g., State v. Douty, 92 Wash. 2d 930, 934, 603 P.2d 373, 375 (1979).
Seattle University Law Review
B. The Legal Status of Nonmarital Children Prior to the Former WPA
The bastard, like the prostitute, thief, and beggar, belongs to that
motley crowd of disreputable social types which society has gener-
ally resented, always endured. He is a living symbol of social ir-
regularity, an undeniable evidence of contramoral forces; in short, a
problem-a problem as old and unsolved as human existence it-
self.58
As evident from the quotation above, the historical treatment of
nonmarital children was quite harsh. Under the English common law, a
nonmarital child was fillius nullius ("no one's son") and had few rights
with respect to his or her parents. 59 Although American common law
followed the English tradition with respect to the nonmarital child's fa-
ther,6 ° it did impose a duty of support on the nonmarital child's mother.6'
Washington has imposed the duty of support on both of the non-
marital child's biological parents62 since Washington first became a state.
Washington's original bastardy statute was enacted as part of
Washington's Territorial Code of 188163 and became part of the statutory
law when Washington became a State.64 The bastardy statute authorized
a civil action against the putative father: if a jury found the man "guilty"
of fathering the nonmarital child, he was required to support the child
with his earnings and property. 65 In 1903, however, the Tieman Court
held that the statute was unconstitutional because it was enacted under an
improper title.66
58. Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 215 (1939),
quoted in HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY I (Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).
59. KRAUSE, supra note 58, at 2; Laurence C. Nolan, "'Unwed Children" and Their Parents
Before the United States Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1999); see also State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 298-99,
73 P. 375, 376 (1903) ("At the common law a bastard was nullius filius [sic], and was incapable of
inheriting either from his putative father or his mother, and, as that law was administered in England,
neither a father nor mother was under any legal obligation to support an illegitimate child.").
60. See, e.g., Tieman, 32 Wash. at 298, 73 P.2d at 376 ("[l]n the absence of a statute there is no
legal obligation on the part of a putative father to support his illegitimate child.").
61. Friesner v. Symonds, 20 A. 257, 259 (1890); see also Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637
(1892); Town of Hudson v. Hills, 8 N.H. 417 (1836); Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9
Wash. 419, 423, 37 P. 660, 661 (1894) ("It is the universal holding of the courts, and in many states
is made a provision of the statute, that the mother of an illegitimate child, in the absence of special
reasons, is entitled to its custody .... ).
62. At common law, a parent was either the biological mother or biological father of a child.
State ex rel. D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. 182, 189, 34 P.3d 887, 891-92 (2001).
63. Tieman, 32 Wash. at 294, 73 P. at 375; see Territorial Code of Wash. §§ 1212-1221
(1881).
64. Goodner v. Speed, 96 Wash. 2d 838, 841, 640 P.2d 13, 14-15 (1982).
65. Tieman, 32 Wash. at 297, 73 P. at 375.
66. The territorial legislature had enacted the statute under the title "An Act relative to crimes
and punishments and proceedings in criminal cases." Id. at 298, 73 P. at 376. However, the terri-
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Rather than "revive" the original bastardy statute, the legislature
enacted a completely new filiation act in 1919.67 Unlike the former
statute, the new filiation act authorized the arrest and incarceration of the
putative father of the nonmarital child.6 s Once a complaint was filed by
an unmarried woman, her parents, or her guardian, the prosecuting attor-
ney could prosecute the action in the name of the state.69  If the court
found that the man was the father of the child, the father was ordered to
pay a specific sum of money each year until the child was sixteen years
old, together with the costs of the mother's pregnancy and delivery, and
the cost of the suit.70 The filiation act was in effect until 1976, at which
time it was repealed and replaced with the former WPA.7'
C. The History and Purpose of the Former WPA
The primary goal of the former WPA was the equalization of the
rights of all children, whether born to married or unmarried parents.
When NCCUSL first began drafting UPA (1973), "the notion of substan-
tive legal equality for children regardless of the marital status of their
parents seemed revolutionary. 72 Although NCCUSL had previously
promoted equal rights of support and inheritance in the Uniform Pater-
nity Act 73 and the Uniform Probate Code,74 many states retained laws
that differentiated significantly in the legal treatment of marital and
nonmarital children.75
tory's Organic Act of March 2, 1853, ch. 90, § 6, 10 Stat. 175, required "that 'every law shall em-
brace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."' Tieman, 32 Wash. at 296, 73 P. at 375.
Because bastardy proceedings were civil in nature, "the statute . . . could not lawfully be enacted as
part of a general enactment having for its title a reference to criminal objects and procedure only...
Id. at 298, 73 P. at 376; see also Goodner, 96 Wash.2d at 842-43, 640 P.2d 13, 15-16.
67. State v. Coffey, 77 Wash. 2d 630, 636, 465 P.2d 665, 668-69 (1970); see 1919 Wash. Sess.
Laws 709.
68. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.24.010-.020 (1976).
69. Id. § 26.24.010; State v. Douty, 92 Wash. 2d 930, 933-34, 603 P.2d 373, 374-75 (1979).
Neither the State, nor the father could independently institute an action under the statute. Douty, 92
Wash. 2d at 933-34, 603 P.2d at 374-75.
70. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.24.090 (1976).
71. See 1975-76 Wash. Sess. Laws (2d Ex. Sess.) 1969.
72. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 378 (2001) (citing Harry D.
Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967)). The UPA (1973) origi-
nated with a law review article written by Professor Krause, entitled "Bringing the Bastard into the
Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy." Id.; see Harry D. Krause, Bringing the
Bastard into the Great Society--A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829
(1966). Professor Krause went on to publish a seminal book on the legal and social status of non-
marital children, see supra note 58, and he served as the Reporter for the UPA (1973). UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 378 (2001).
73. UNIF. PATERNITY ACT (1960), 9B U.L.A. 522 (1966).
74. UNIF. PROBATE CODE (1969), 8 U.L.A. 9 (1998).
75. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 378 (2001) (citing UNIF.
PATERNITY ACT (1960), 9B U.L.A. 522 (1966) and UNIF. PROBATE CODE (1969), 8 U.L.A. 9
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However, a series of United States Supreme Court cases beginning
in 1968 provided both the impetus and a receptive climate for
NCCUSL's promulgation of UPA (1973).76 In Gomez, for example, the
Court declared:
A State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate
children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children
generally .. once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on
behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers
there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying
such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father
has not married its mother.7 7
Thus, with respect to one of the most notable features of UPA
(1973)-its declaration of substantive legal equality for all children re-
gardless of the marital status of their parents7 8 -the drafters believed
(1998)). Although Washington had previously extended the parental duty of support to both marital
and nonmarital children, see supra Part II.B., "an enunciation of the illegitimate child's right to
equal treatment under the law could only be found after a careful search through scattered cases."
Malloy, supra note 43, at 456. Prior to the enactment of the former WPA, "practitioners . . . were
required to pose constitutional arguments or to wade through years of state and federal appellate
decisions before proceeding with filiation suits or with workmen's compensation, probate, adoption,
or wrongful death actions involving illegitimate children." Id. at 457. In addition, it was not until
1968 that the Washington State Supreme Court recognized the constitutional rights of illegitimate
children and aligned itself with what it saw as a "decisive current trend in legislative and decisional
law which ignores legitimacy when creating or applying statutes designed to benefit children."
Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash. 2d 716, 721, 440 P.2d 471, 473 (1968). In Armijo, the court con-
strued the words "child or children" in a wrongful death statute to include illegitimate as well as
legitimate children of deceased parents, id. at 719, 440 P.2d at 472, while noting that
a very persuasive argument can be made that a decision contrary to ours would deny ap-
pellant's daughter her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws, since
there is no valid social reason, for purposes of welfare legislation, for distinguishing be-
tween members of the class "illegitimate children" and other members of the broader
class "children" to which the members of the more narrow class belong.
Id. at 721-22, 440 P.2d at 473-74.
76. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 378 (2001). See, e.g., Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that Louisiana wrongful death statute precluding children
from recovering for wrongful death of their parents due to illegitimacy violated Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73 (1968) (holding that same Louisiana statute precluding mother from recovering for wrongful
death of her illegitimate child violated Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (striking down Louisiana Workman's Com-
pensation statute that denied benefits to unacknowledged illegitimate children); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973) (striking down Texas statute that denied right of paternal support to illegitimate
children).
77. 409 U.S. at 538.
78. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1-2 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 379 (2001). Section 1 defines legal
parentage: "As used in this Act, 'parent and child relationship' means the legal relationship existing
between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes
ights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father
and child relationship." Id. § 1.
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they were merely fulfilling the mandate of the Constitution.79
Washington courts have repeatedly affirmed that the primary purpose of
the former WPA was to provide substantive legal equality for both mari-
tal and nonmarital children.80
D. Key Provisions of the Former WPA Related to
Parentage of Nonmarital Children
Equal legal treatment for nonmarital children demands a determina-
tion of legal parentage that is not dependent upon the marital status of the
child's parents. 81 Thus, former Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
26.26.02082 declared that legal parentage "extends equally to every child
and to every parent, regardless of the parents' marital status. '83 In an
attempt to fulfill the broad proclamation of legal equality for all children,
the former WPA provided several important mechanisms to establish the
paternity8 4 of nonmarital children.
For example, the former WPA contained a network of rebuttable
statutory presumptions of paternity, 85 which applied to circumstances
Section 2 states: "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every par-
ent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Id.
In the Comment to § 2, the drafters emphasized that §§ I and 2 constitute "the major substantive
sections of the Act," and "establish the principle that regardless of the marital status of the parents,
all children and all parents have equal rights with respect to each other." Id.
The corresponding provisions in former WPA (1976) are former RCW § 26.26.010 and former RCW
§ 26.26.020. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.010, .020 (2000).
79. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 379 (2001).
80. See, e.g., State v. Douty, 92 Wash. 2d 930, 936, 603 P.2d 373, 376 (1979); In re Parentage
of Calcaterra, 114 Wash. App. 127, 131, 56 P.3d 1003, 1006 (2002); Gonzales v. Cowen, 76 Wash.
App. 277,281, 88 P.2d 19, 21 (1994).
81. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 390 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.26.020 (2000). The drafters of UPA (1973) noted that the "'sine quo non' of equal legal rights
[is] the identification of the person against whom [legal] rights may be asserted." UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT prefatory note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 379 (2001). In other words, the sine qua non of equal protec-
tion for nonmarital children is the ascertainment of patemity. KRAUSE, supra note 58, at 7.
82. All "former RCW's" referenced in this article refer to provisions of the former WPA.
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.020 (2000) (emphasis added).
84. Because cases involving disputed maternity were viewed as "extraordinarily rare," UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 106 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2005), the provisions concerning
establishing legal parentage were written primarily in terms of ascertaining paternity. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 21 cmt. (1973), 9B U.L.A. 494 (2001). In order to provide for the rare cases
where maternity was disputed, the drafters included a provision stating that "[i]nsofar as practicable,
the provisions of this Act applicable to the father and child relationship apply" to the determination
of maternity. Id. at § 21. This provision was enacted in Washington as former RCW § 26.26.170. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.170 (2000). A similar provision was included in UPA (2000) and in the
current WPA. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 308 (2001); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.26.051 (2004).
85. A presumption of paternity under RCW § 26.26.040(l) could only be rebutted by "clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence," or by a court decree establishing paternity of the child by another
man. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(2) (2000).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 30:195
strongly indicating a certain man was the child's father. 86 Three of these
presumptions were of particular importance in protecting the interests of
nonmarital children.
First, under the former RCW 26.26.040(d), a man was presumed to
be the natural8 7 father of a child if he received the child into his home
when the child was a minor and openly held the child out as his own.
88
The man did not have to be married to the child's mother.89
Second, the former RCW 26.26.040(e) provided that a man was the
presumed father if he acknowledged his paternity of the child in a writing
filed with the state registrar of vital statistics.90 An affidavit acknowledg-
ing paternity could be completed by the unmarried mother and father
upon the birth of their child.91 The acknowledgement became a legal
finding of paternity sixty days after filing, and it could not subsequently
86. See id. § 26.26.040 (2000); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 379
(2001).
87. Washington courts have construed "natural parent" to include biological parents or anyone
otherwise determined to be a legal parent under the former WPA. See, e.g., State ex rel. D.R.M., 109
Wash. App. 182, 189, 34 P.3d at 887, 891-92 (2001) ("Under the UPA, a parent is either a natural
parent or an adoptive parent. A natural parent includes a parent who is biologically related to the
child and includes one who is otherwise determined to be a parent under the act."); In re Parentage
of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 384 n.6, 119 P.3d 840, 845 (2005) ("We use the term
'natural' father because former chapter 26.26 RCW used that term to describe legal paternity."). It
appears that Washington courts arrived at this definition through the process ofjudicial construction;
historically, "natural" parent meant "biological" parent, and some jurisdictions still adhere to this
definition. See e.g., In re Zacharia D., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751, 760 n.15 (Sup. Ct. 1993) ("A biological
or natural father is one whose biological paternity has been established, but who has not achieved
presumed father status .... "); In re A.A., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 755, 759 (App. Ct. 2003) ("A natural fa-
ther is one who has been established as a child's biological father."); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d
760, 762 (Ohio Ct. Coin. Pl. 1994) ("While various terms are used to identify a natural parent, a
review of case law leads to the conclusion that 'natural parent' refers to the child and parent being of
the same blood or related by blood."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275, 97 (2d pocket ed. 2001)
(defining "natural father" as "[tihe man who impregnated the child's natural mother"; defining
"natural child" as "[a] child by birth, as distinguished from an adopted child" or "[a] child that is
genetically related to the mother and father as opposed to a child conceived by donor insemination or
by egg donation"; and cross-referencing "natural mother" with "birth mother" and "biological
mother."). The drafters of UPA (2000) specifically replaced the term "natural father" with the term
"genetic father." See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 305 (2001).
88. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(d) (2000). The corresponding provision in UPA (1973)
required that the man openly hold out the child "as his natural child." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §
4(a)(4) (1973), 9B U.L.A. 394 (2001) (emphasis added). Washington deleted the word "natural"
when it enacted the former WPA. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(d) (2000).
89. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(d) (2000).
90. See id. § 26.26.040(e). A man could acknowledge his paternity pursuant to former RCW
70.58.080, see infra note 91, or in a writing filed with the state registrar of vital statistics. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.26.040(e) (2000).
91. See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.58.080(4)(a) (2000). This affidavit had to contain a sworn
statement by the mother consenting to the assertion of paternity and stating that this was the only
possible father, and it had to contain a sworn statement by the father that he was the natural father of
the child. See id. at § 70.58.080(4)(a)(i)-(ii).
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be challenged in court except on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact.
92
Finally, the former RCW 26.26.040(g) established a presumption of
paternity if genetic testing indicated a ninety-eight percent or greater
probability of paternity.93 Upon request by a party,94 the trial court could
order genetic testing of the child, mother, and any alleged or presumed
father who was a party to the proceeding.
95
E. The Former WPA's Problematic Artificial Insemination Provision
Although the former WPA's network of paternity presumptions af-
forded significant protection to the interests of nonmarital children, the
statute governing the parentage of children conceived through artificial
insemination, former RCW 26.26.050,96 was partially flawed. Under
former RCW 26.26.050(2), a man who provided semen to a licensed
physician for the artificial insemination of a woman other than his wife
would not be considered the legal father of the resulting child, unless he
and the woman had agreed in writing that he would be the father.97
The effect of this provision was that the paternity of a nonmarital
child conceived through artificial insemination could be established un-
der the statute only if the mother and the donor signed an agreement
specifying that the donor was to be the legal father. 98
The requirement of written consent served several salutary pur-
poses. First, by ensuring that sperm donors would not be the legal fathers
of children created with their sperm, it protected single women and un-
married couples who used donor sperm to conceive children.99 Second, it
92. See id. § 70.58.080(4)(a)(i)-(ii).
93. See id § 70.58.040(g).
94. Under former RCW § 26.26.060, a party could include a child, a child's natural mother, a
man alleged or alleging himself to be the father, a presumed father, a child's guardian, a child's
personal representative, the state of Washington, or any interested party. See id § 26.26.060(l)(a)-
(b) (2000).
95. See id § 26.26.100(1) (2000).
96. Id. § 26.26.050. As discussed infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text, former RCW
§ 26.26.050 covered only artificial insemination and did not cover any other forms of assisted repro-
ductive technology.
97. Id. § 26.26.050(2) (2000). The consent had to be signed by both the man and the woman
and filed by the supervising physician with the State Department of Health. Id. Former RCW §
26.26.050(1) provided that if a wife was artificially inseminated under the supervision of a physician
with semen donated by a man who was not her husband, but did so with her husband's consent, then
the husband was the legal father of the resulting child. Id. § 26.26.050(1). The written consent simi-
larly had to be signed by the husband and wife and filed by the supervising physician with the State
Department of Health. Id.
98. See id. § 26.26.050(2) (2000).
99. See id; Paula Roberts, Biology and Beyond: The Case for Passage of the New Uniform
Parentage Act, 35 FAM. L.Q. 41, 47-48 (2001). For detailed discussion of the rise of "single moth-
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protected sperm donors from parental obligations) 00 Protecting donors
from parental obligations was arguably important to ensure an adequate
supply of donor semen; without assurance of immunity from parental
liability, potential donors could be discouraged from donating.
0 1
However, the problem with former RCW 26.26.050(2) was that it
also seemed to shield from parental responsibility those men who, with
full intent to be a father, used their own sperm to conceive a child with
their nonmarital partner through artificial insemination, but simply failed
to consent in writing to the procedure. This problem was highlighted by
the recent Washington Supreme Court Case, J.MK.1
02
In JMK., °3 Kepl was John's presumed father because he signed a
paternity affidavit after John's birth.'0 4 However, Kepl argued that for-
mer RCW 70.58.080(4)105 allowed only natural fathers to sign an affida-
vit of paternity and that his affidavit was invalid because he was not
John's natural father. 0 6 Kepl maintained that he was not John's natural
father because he had not signed a written agreement in advance of arti-
ficial insemination as provided under former RCW 26.26.050(2).107 Us-
ing a plain language interpretation of the artificial insemination statute,
the court of appeals agreed with Kepl and held that Kepl was not John's
legal father because the requisite paperwork had never been com-
pleted 08
The supreme court reversed, however, holding that Kepl had
waived any potential rights to statutory protection as a sperm donor by
signing a paternity affidavit and allowing it to become a legal finding of
paternity after sixty days. 10 9 The court reasoned that this interpretation
was consistent with the overall statutory scheme of encouraging parental
erhood by choice," see generally Jane D. Bock, Doing the Right Thing? Single Motherhood by
Choice and the Struggle for Legitimacy, 14 GENDER AND SOC'Y 62 (2000).
100. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (2000).
101. See John M. Dwyer, Comment, Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children Conceived by
Artificial Insemination, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1984); Barbara K. Padgett, Note, Ille-
gitimate Children Conceived by Artificial Insemination: Does Some State Legislation Deny them
Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment?, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 511, 521 (1994).
102. In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 119 P.3d 840 (2005).
103. The facts of J.M.K. are recited supra Part 1.
104. 155 Wash. 2d at 379, 119 P.3d at 842-43; see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(1)(e)
(2000).
105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106. J.M.K., 155 Wash. 2d at 388, 119 P.3d at 847. "Natural" father as used in this context
refers to "legal" father. See supra note 87.
107. J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d at 382, 119 P.3d at 844; see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (2000).
108. In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 121 Wash. App. 578, 583, 89 P.3d 309, 311-12
(2004).
109. J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d at 389, 119 P.3d at 847-48; see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.040(e)
(2000); see supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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responsibility for married and unmarried parents" ° and emphasized that
former RCW 26.26.050(2) is an exception to the long-standing rule that a
child's parents are his or her biological mother and father, who have a
duty to support the child regardless of their marital status."'
Moreover, the court felt compelled to construe the statute in this
manner because of the constitutional difficulties raised by Kepl's prof-
fered interpretation.'" 2 Under Kepl's theory, a man who used his own
sperm to conceive a child with his nonmarital partner through artificial
insemination would be permanently barred from being established as the
child's legal father if he and the woman failed to sign a written consent
prior to artificial insemination.' 13
In contrast, the failure of a husband to sign a written consent prior
to the artificial insemination of his wife did not automatically shield him
from parental liability. First, although former RCW 26.26.050(1) re-
quired a husband to sign a consent form in order to be the legal father of
a child conceived through artificial insemination using sperm donated by
another man, the statute contained no consent requirement for a husband
to be the legal father of a child conceived through artificial insemination
using his own sperm." 4 Second, even if the husband failed to consent in
writing to the artificial insemination of his wife with sperm from another
man, this did not bar him from being established as the legal father of the
110. J.M.K., 155 Wash. 2d at 389, 119 P.3d at 848-49 (citing, inter alia, WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.020 (2000) (parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent,
regardless of the marital status of the parents) and WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.080 (2000) (requiring
physicians and midwives to provide an opportunity for a child's mother and father to complete an
affidavit acknowledging paternity, formally accepting their statutory and common law duty to pro-
vide support for their child)).
11. Id.; see supra note 62. See generally In re Feldman's Welfare, 94 Wash. 2d 244, 250, 615
P.2d 1290, 1294 (1980) ("[Pjarents bear the primary responsibility for the support of their chil-
dren."); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 599, 575 P.2d 201, 206 (1978) ("That there is a
parental duty of support owing to children has been clear since 1881 .... "); State v. Norman, 61
Wash. App. 16, 22, 808 P.2d 1159, 1162 (1991) ("For over a hundred years, it has been commonly
accepted a parent has a duty to maintain his children .... This duty has been referred to as a 'natu-
ral' or even a 'sacred' duty, and 'a basic tenet of our society and law' .... ) (citations omitted);
Holaday v. Merceri, 49 Wash. App. 321, 325, 742 P.2d 127, 129 (1987) ("In Washington the co-
equal responsibility to support dependent children is imposed upon natural parents both by statute..
. and by common law."); West v. Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., 21 Wash. App. 577, 578-79, 586
P.2d 516, 517-18 (1978) ("A natural parent is under a duty to provide support for his or her chil-
dren.").
112. SeeJ.MK., 155 Wash. 2d at 389-90, 119 P.3d at 847-48; see infra note 116.
113. See J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d at 386, 388, 119 P.3d at 846-47; see supra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text. Of course, the unmarried man could choose to assume parental obligations by
adopting the child, but he would not be liable for child support payments unless he voluntarily chose
to adopt the child. The availability of adoption as a means of securing legal parenthood is of no
assistance in situations such as J.MK., where the biological father denies his parental obligations.
See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
114. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (2000).
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resulting child. Because the child in this scenario would be born during
the marriage, the husband was the presumed legal father under former
RCW 26.26.040(1)(a), despite the absence of a written consent.
Thus, while failure to sign a written consent did not automatically
bar a husband from being established as the legal father, under Kepl's
theory, an unmarried couple's failure to sign a written consent prior to
artificial insemination would permanently bar the male partner from be-
ing established as the legal father of the resulting child. The court found
this interpretation to be constitutionally infirm because it treated "ille-
gitimate" children and their fathers differently than "legitimate" children
and their fathers.
1 16
The more difficult problem in J.MK. concerned Kepl and Brock's
second child, David. Because Kepl had not signed a paternity affidavit
for David, the court could not hold that Kepl had waived his statutory
protection as a sperm donor." 7 Rather than resolve the difficult question
of whether former RCW 26.26.050(2) precluded a biological, intended
father of a nonmarital ART child from being established as the legal fa-
ther if the parents failed to sign any kind of written paternity agreement,
the court found a convenient loophole in the artificial insemination stat-
ute. 1  It simply construed the statute literally: because David was con-
ceived through in vitro fertilization,119 rather than through artificial in-
semination, 120 the plain language of the statute did not apply to the facts
of the case. 121 Therefore, because blood tests had identified Kepl as
115. See id. § 26.26.040(1)(a), which provided, in part:
(1) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child for all intents and purposes if:
(a) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child
is born during the marriage, or within three hundred days after the marriage is terminated.
116. See J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d at 390, 119 P.3d at 848. The Court did not elaborate on the
reasoning as to why Kepl's interpretation was constitutionally questionable, but stated:
Furthermore, Kepl's contention raises serious constitutional concerns. Under Kepl's the-
ory, a written agreement for paternity and legal responsibility including financial support
between an unmarried couple, the mother and biological father, evidenced by a signed
paternity acknowledgment, would not be sufficient to establish fatherhood responsibili-
ties. Commentators have noted that the serious constitutional concerns regarding the
treatment of illegitimate children and their fathers led to the creation of the Uniform Par-
entage Act ... [citing law review articles and cases affirming the proposition that states
cannot deny illegitimate children certain rights granted to legitimate children] . . . Ac-
cordingly, we hold that Kepl became the legal (natural) father of J.M.K. 60 days after the
paternity affidavit.., was filed.
Id.
117. See id. at 391, 119 P.3d at 848.
118. See id. at 393, 119 P.3d at 849-50.
119. See definition supra note 7.
120. See definition supra note 5.
121. J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d at 392-93, 119 P.3d at 849. The Court, no doubt, was willing to
adopt this interpretation of the statute in large part because the passage of the new WPA in 2002
guaranteed that the Court's decision would not upset settled expectations about the law's protection
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David's biological father, the court held that he was the presumed natural
father under former RCW 26.26.040(l)(g). 122 However, if David had
been conceived through artificial insemination, rather than in vitro fer-
tilization, this legal loophole would not have been available, and it is
unlikely the court could have held that Kepl was the legal father of David
under the former WPA without judicially re-writing the artificial insemi-
nation provision. 1
23
Thus, as demonstrated by J.MK., the former WPA's provisions
governing the parentage of nonmarital ART children were partially
flawed. The paternity of a nonmarital child conceived through artificial
insemination could only be established under the Act if the mother and
the biological father agreed in writing before the procedure that the bio-
logical father would be the legal father, or if the biological father signed
a paternity affidavit after the child's birth. The former WPA thus im-
properly shielded from parental liability those men who, with full intent
to be a father, used their own sperm to conceive a child with their non-
marital partner through artificial insemination, but simply failed to sign a
written paternity agreement. 24
III. THE WPA'S UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL EQUALITY
Unfortunately, the current WPA is a step backwards from the for-
mer WPA: not only has the WPA removed existing protections for non-
marital children, it has actually exacerbated the unequal treatment of
marital and nonmarital ART children. This Part begins with a brief de-
scription of the WPA's enactment and its purported policy of substantive
legal equality for all children. It continues by pointing out three major
flaws in the WPA: (1) the removal of previously existing statutory pro-
tection for nonmarital children who have established long-term parent-
child relationships with non-biological fathers;125 (2) the statutory treat-
ment of biological fathers of nonmarital ART children as automatic
of sperm donors from parental obligations. Any future cases involving a paternity dispute in the
context of assisted reproduction would be governed by RCW § 26.26.702, which explicitly covers
all forms of assisted reproduction. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.702 (2004); see supra note 30.
122. J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d at 383, 119 P.3d at 844; see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying
text. Blood tests also indicated that Kepl was the biological father of John. J.MK, 155 Wash. 2d at
383, 119 P.3d at 844.
123. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (2000).
124. One commentator suggests that former RCW § 26.26.050(2) violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying nonmarital children conceived through artificial
insemination the right to paternal support. See Padgett, supra note 101, at 519-20; see also Dwyer,
supra note 101, at 1067-72 (arguing that a similar California artificial insemination statute violates
the Equal Protection Clause).
125. See infra Part III.B.
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sperm donors regardless of their intent to be a parent; 126 and (3) the in-
ability of the biological father of a nonmarital ART child to waive statu-
tory protection as a sperm donor by signing an acknowledgement of pa-
ternity. 127 Next, this Part discusses the negative public policy implica-
tions of the WPA. 128 Finally, the serious constitutional deficiencies of the
WPA are exposed through an analysis of whether its disparate treatment
of marital and nonmarital ART children withstands heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
29
A. The History and Purported Policies of the WPA
In 1997, NCCUSL formed a drafting committee to revise UPA
(1973) in order to help states develop a statutory framework to address
emerging ART issues and to meet new federal standards related to pater-
nity establishment for nonmarital children.1 30 First, enormous techno-
logical changes in reproductive technology had created challenging new
public policy issues. 131 Legislative action in this area was particularly
needed because the use of ART and gestational (surrogacy) agreements
became common in the 1990s, long after UPA (1973) was drafted.
13 2
Additionally, between 1984 and 1998, Congress passed a number
of laws requiring states to streamline the process for establishing the pa-
ternity of nonmarital children.133 In order to maintain federal funding for
child support and welfare programs, states are required to enact certain
laws and procedures governing voluntary acknowledgements of paternity
and contested paternity cases.1 34 UPA (2000) contained all of the provi-
sions regarding the paternity of nonmarital children that states needed to
retain federal funding for these programs. 135
126. See infra Part III.C.
127. See infra Part I1I.D.
128. See infra Part III.E.
129. See infra Part |II.F.
130. Roberts, supra note 99, at 43.
131. Id. at 42. For example, "[S]hould the law allow biological parents to enter into agreements
by which they are not responsible for the resulting child? Should the law sanction a couple's agree-
ment to be responsible for a child to whom they are not biologically related?" Id.
132. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 297 (2001).
133. Roberts, supra note 99, at 42-43. For example, under Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act, states must enact certain laws relating to the establishment of paternity in order to qualify for
federal money towards the basic cost of running a child support program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 655, 666
(2000). Failureto pass a required law means that the state cannot obtain approval of its state child
support plan and results in ineligibility for federal child support funds. See id. § 654 (2000). Failure
of a state to obtain approval of its child support plan also results in ineligibility for federal TANF
funds (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, commonly known as welfare). See id § 602(a)(2)
(2000).
134. Roberts, supra note 99, at 42-43.
135. Id at43.
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Although UPA (2000) was approved by NCCUSL in August
2000,136 the Act was never approved by the American Bar Association
(ABA). 137 The Act was scheduled for approval by the ABA House of
Delegates at its annual midyear meeting on February 19, 2001."' How-
ever, because of last minute concerns expressed in a letter by the Chair of
the Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section (ABA-IR&R Letter),
the Act was withdrawn from consideration. 139 The chief complaint from
the Individual Rights and Responsibility Section, later joined by the
ABA Steering Committee on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children, was
that the proposed Act treated marital and nonmarital children differ-
ently. 140 These concerns will be discussed in more detail in the sections
that follow.
14 '
Despite the immediate criticism of the Act, in 2002 Washington be-
came the second state to adopt a version of UPA (2000).142 Texas and
Washington were the only states to enact a version of UPA (2000) before




140. Sampson (2002), supra note 54, at 2. The Drafting Committee had made a "clearly debat-
able" policy decision "to give special deference to married couples" and had limited assisted repro-
ductive issues and gestational agreements to married couples, "notwithstanding the fact that children
born of such unions would be treated differently than children born to a married couple as biological
parents or as intended parents." Id. Details of the controversy are described in Professor Sampson's
Preface to the Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act (2002), see id., and in Professor
Sampson's unofficial annotations to UPA (2000), see Uniform Parentage Act (2000) With Prefatory
Note and Comments (and with Unofficial Annotations by John J Sampson, Reporter), 35 FAM. L.Q.
83 (2001) [hereinafter Sampson Annotations]. Portions of the ABA-IR&R letter are also reproduced
in Professor Sampson's unofficial annotations to UPA (2000). See id. "After the Act was withdrawn
in February 2001, extended, sometimes dilatory, contact between NCCUSL and the ABA entities
continued for more than a year." Sampson (2002), supra note 54, at 2. On March 7, 2002, the Sec-
tion of Individual Rights and Responsibilities and the Steering Committee on the Unmet Legal
Needs of Children submitted a detailed summary of objections to UPA (2000) to NCCUSL. See
Comments on the Revised Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of 2000 (Mar. 7, 2002) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter IR&R-SCULNC Objection Memo]. In a response letter, dated April 30, 2002, the
Chair of the Drafting Committee responded that, although the interest of the two ABA Sections was
"sincerely appreciated," the drafters remained convinced that the Act was "basically sound." Letter
from Harry L. Tindall, Chair, Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Parentage Act, to Mark D.
Agrast, Chair-Elect, ABA Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section (Apr. 30, 2002) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Tindall Response Letter]. However, in the interest of compromise, face-to-
face negotiations were scheduled for September 13-14, 2002, which led to an amicable resolution of
policy differences and resulted in the 2002 Amendments to the UPA. Sampson (2002), supra note
54, at 3. "Key to the agreed settlement [was] that a child born to an unmarried man and woman,
including children born through assisted reproduction ... should have the same rights and relation-
ship with his or her parents or intended parents as a child bom to a married couple." Id. See infra
Part IV for discussion of selected Amendments.
141. See infra Part I11.B-D.
142. See authorities cited supra note 54.
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it was amended. 143 After UPA (2000) was replaced with UPA (2002),
Texas enacted many of the amendments. 44 Washington, however, has
not enacted any of the suggested amendments. 145
The WPA reaffirms that the primary purpose of Washington's Par-
entage Act is to provide substantive legal equality for all children, re-
gardless of the marital status of their parents: "A child born to parents
who are not married to each other has the same rights under the law as a
child born to parents who are married to each other., 146 However, be-
cause of certain "updated" provisions of the WPA, this lofty proclama-
tion is nothing more than an empty promise.
B. The WPA Eliminates the Holding Out Provision
First, the WPA destroys a longstanding protective mechanism for
nonmarital children by eliminating the presumption of paternity when a
man takes a minor child into his home and holds the child out as his own.
Under RCW 26.26.116, all presumptions of paternity are limited to the
143. See Sampson (2002), supra note 54, at 4; TEX. FAM. CODE ch. 160 (2001).
144. Sampson, supra note 54, at 4; see TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 160.001-.763 (Supp.
2005). Unfortunately, Texas declined to amend Article 7, Child of Assisted Reproduction. Sampson,
supra note 54, at 4; see TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 160.701-.707 (Supp. 2005). Texas did, how-
ever, amend the provision governing voluntary acknowledgements of paternity, allowing biological
fathers of nonmarital ART children to legally sign paternity acknowledgments. See id at § 160.301;
see discussion infra Part III.D. Texas also chose to enact the UPA (2000) version of Article 8, Gesta-
tional Agreement, which Washington never enacted. See TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 160.751-.763
(Supp. 2005).
145. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.011-.913 (2004); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 103-807
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 2005). Since the promulgation of the 2002 Amendments,
Deleware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming have enacted versions of UPA (2002). See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-01 to 9-904 (Supp. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-01 to -66 (Supp.
2005); 2006 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 116 (West); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45g-101 to -902 (Supp.
2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-401 to -907 (2005). However, following Texas's lead, Utah chose
to enact the UPA(2000) versions of Article 7, Child of Assisted Reproduction, and Article 8, Gesta-
tional Agreement. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45g-701 to -809 (Supp. 2005). Oklahoma declined to
enact any of the provisions governing the parentage of ART children. See 2006 Okla. Sess. Law
Serv. Ch. 116 (West).
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.106 (2004). This language is noticeably different from the
language of former RCW 26.26.020, which stated specifically that "[tihe parent and child relation-
ship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the par-
ents." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.020 (2000) (emphasis added). Implicit in the language of this
statute was the proposition that the marital status of a child's biological parents should have no bear-
ing on the legal parentage of the child. See id.; id. § 26.26.010 ("'parent and child relationship means
the legal relationship existing between a child and his or her natural or adoptive parents .... ). In
contrast, RCW 26.26.106 is less clear about whether the marital status of a child's biological parents
should affect his or her legal parentage; it implies that only once the legal parent-child relationship is
established are the rights of married and unmarried children guaranteed to be equal. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.26.106 (2004). This change of language is significant because one of the major problems
with the WPA is that it makes the legal paternity of an ART child dependent upon whether the
child's biological father is married to its mother. See infra Part I1I.B--C.
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context of marriage, and there is no holding out provision. 47 A man is
presumed to be the father of a child only if the child is born during the
parents' marriage or within 300 days of a marriage's termination, or if
the parents marry after the child is born and the father voluntarily asserts
his paternity of the child.
148
By eliminating the holding out provision, the WPA leaves genetics
as the sole means of establishing paternity for nonmarital children. 49 The
Comment to the corresponding provision in UPA (2000) states that
"[t]his presumption was not carried forward because genetic testing is a
far better means of determining paternity."' 50 But, as noted in the IR&R-
SCULNC Objection Memo, "[t]he Comment does not offer any explana-
tion as to why biology should be the exclusive means of establishing le-
gal parentage for nonmarital children when it is not the exclusive means
147. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.116 (2004).
148. Id. The parents must be married "in apparent compliance with law," and the invalidity of
the marriage does not affect a presumption of paternity for a child bom during or within 300 days of
the termination of such a marriage. Id. § 26.26.116(1)(c). Additionally, in order for the presumption
to apply to a father who voluntarily asserts his paternity of a child born before his marriage to the
mother, the father must file the assertion with the state registrar of vital statistics, must agree to be
named as the father on the child's birth certificate, and must promise in a record to support the child
as his own. Id. § 26.26.116(1)(d)(i)-(iii). Finally, a presumption of paternity established under this
section may be rebutted only by an adjudication of paternity under RCW 26.26.050-.630. See id. §§
26.26.116(2), .26.050-.630.
149. See Sampson (2002), supra note 54, at 2 ("Disputes between unmarried parents were left
to resolution by scientific parentage testing."); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.101(2) (2004). RCW
26.26.101(2) provides:
(2) The father-child relationship is established between a child and a man by:
(a) An unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity of the child under RCW
26.26.116;
(b) The man's having signed an acknowledgment of paternity under RCW
26.26.300 through 26.26.375, unless the acknowledgment has been rescinded
or successfully challenged;
(c) An adjudication of the man's paternity;
(d) Adoption of the child by the man;
(e) The man's having consented to assisted reproduction by his wife under
RCW 26.26.700 through 26.26.73 that resulted in the birth of the child; or
(f) A valid surrogate parentage contract, under which the father is an intended
parent of the child, as provided in RCW 26.26.210 through 26.26.260.
Id. § 26.26.101(2). Regarding subsection (b), in order to sign an acknowledgment of paternity under
RCW 26.26.300, the father must swear under penalty of perjury that the child was conceived as the
result of his sexual intercourse with the mother. See infra Part III.D. Regarding subsection (c), an
adjudication of paternity for a child with no presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated father is gov-
erned by the results of genetic testing. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.101(2)(c) (2004). Regarding
subsection (d), while adoption is available for a father who wants to voluntarily assume parental
liability for a child, this option is of no assistance to a mother or state welfare agency that is attempt-
ing to establish paternity in order to collect child support. Subsection (e) is limited by its terms to
married couples. Genetic testing is thus the only mechanism recognized under the WPA to establish
the legal paternity of a nonmarital child who has not been adopted.
150. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 312 (2001).
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for children whose parents are married."' 51 The result of this limitation is
that an unmarried man, with no biological connection to a child whom he
has allowed to grow up knowing and depending upon him as her father,
cannot be adjudicated that child's legal father-regardless of the emo-
tionally and financially devastating consequences to the child. 152 This
result is at odds with Washington precedent establishing that biology is
not a prerequisite to a finding of legal paternity. 153 It is also inconsistent
with the policy behind RCW 26.26.535, which allows a court to deny on
equitable grounds genetic testing of a presumed (married) parent in a
proceeding to adjudicate parentage. 54 The drafters of the corresponding
provision in UPA (2000) provided no justification for this differential
treatment of marital and nonmarital children. 155 There is no apparent rea-
son why the paternity of nonmarital children requires proof of a genetic
link, while the paternity of marital children does not. 1
56
The elimination of the holding out provision is particularly trou-
bling, however, because under the WPA the existence of a genetic rela-
tionship to a nonmarital ART child cannot serve as the basis for a finding
of legal paternity. The WPA treats the biological father of a nonmarital
ART child as an automatic sperm donor 157 and, unlike the former WPA,
does not allow him to waive statutory protection as a sperm donor by
signing an acknowledgment of paternity. 15 Thus, by failing to retain the
holding out provision, the legislature has eliminated the only other statu-
tory avenue for a biological father of a nonmarital ART child to waive
his protection as a sperm donor.
151. IR&R-SCULNC Objection Memo, supra note 140, at 3.
152. See id.
153. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wendy M., 92 Wash. App. 430, 438, 962 P.2d 130, 133 (1998)
(refusing to disestablish legal father's paternity despite genetic evidence indicating that he was not
the child's biological father because he was "the only father the child has ever known" and disestab-
lishing paternity would have destroyed the stability of the child's world with respect to the identity
of his father).
154. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.535 (2004). Pursuant to this provision, a court may deny a
motion for genetic testing in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage and issue an order adjudicating the
husband to be the father of the child, under certain circumstances. Id. One common example is
where a husband knows that a child of the marriage is not, in fact, his biological child, but he none-
theless affirmatively expresses his acceptance of his role as the child's father. UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 608 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 343 (2001).
155. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 311-312 (2001);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A.343-344 (2001).
156. See IR&R-SCULNC Objection Memo, supra note 140, at 3-4.
157. See infra Part II1.C.
158. See infra Part IID; see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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C. A Nonmarital ART Child has Only One Legal Parent Under the WPA
Under the WPA's provisions governing the parentage of ART chil-
dren, 59 the biological father of a nonmarital ART child is automatically
considered a sperm donor. RCW 26.26.705 declares that "a donor is not
a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.,' 60 "Do-
nor" is defined in the definitional section of the Chapter to include all
individuals who produce sperm or eggs for use in assisted reproduction,
except for (1) a husband who provides sperm to be used for assisted re-
production by his wife, (2) a wife who provides eggs to be used for her
assisted reproduction, and (3) a woman who gives birth to a child by
means of assisted reproduction, except as otherwise provided in the pro-
visions governing surrogacy.' 6 1 There is no exception for the intended
father of a nonmarital ART child.
162
The effect of this all-encompassing definition of "donor" is that it
leaves nonmarital ART children with no legal father, even if the facts of
the case clearly indicate that the biological father was in no sense of the
word a true "donor."' 63 For example, if the factual scenario presented in
J.MK. had arisen under the current WPA, Kepl would have been consid-
ered a sperm donor with no parental obligations because he provided
sperm which was to be used for assisted reproduction by someone other
than his wife.
164
This very same concern was expressed in the ABA-IR&R letter
with respect to the analogous provisions in UPA (2000) Article 7, Child
of Assisted Reproduction.' 65 In an unofficial annotation to the official
159. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.700-.740, 011(3), .011(4), .011(8) (2004). RCW
26.26.700-.740 correspond to UPA (2000) Article 7, Child of Assisted Reproduction. See UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 354 -59 (2001).
160. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.705 (2004).
161. See id. § 26.26.01 1(8)(a)-(b), which provides:
(8) "Donor" means an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduc-
tion, whether or not for consideration. The term does not include:
(a) A husband who provides sperm, or a wife who provides eggs, to be used
for assisted reproduction by the wife; or
(b) A woman who gives birth to a child by means of assisted reproduction,
except as otherwise provided in RCW 26.26.210 through 26.26.260 or
26.26.735.
162. See id.
163. See id § 26.26.705.
164. See id §§ 26.26.01 l(8)(a), .705; In re Parentage of.I.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374,
378, 119 P.3d 840, 842 (2005). This analysis assumes that a court would apply the plain language of
the parentage provisions without attempting to avoid the undesirable outcome through creative judi-
cial construction. As will be seen in the following section, Kepl could not have waived this statutory
protection by signing an acknowledgment of paternity. See infra Part II.D.
165. The letter stated the following:
In contrast with the principles of the ABA, the ALl, and the purported goal of
the UPA itself, the new UPA largely ignores the needs of children bom out-
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comment for UPA (2000) § 703, Professor John J. Sampson, the Re-
porter for UPA (2000), attempted to deflect this criticism by arguing that
a nonmarital ART child's biological father could be the legal father if the
child's parents had intended for the man to be a co-parent rather than a
donor:
The establishment of paternity based on intent of a nonmarital part-
ner who contributes sperm with the intent to be a parent is analo-
gous to Section 102(8)(A). 66 Such a man can be found not to be a
'donor' if the understanding between him and the mother was that
they intended him to have parental rights, not donative exclusion of
those rights. Further, if a woman has a child through assisted repro-
duction while living with another person of either sex, that individ-
ual may adopt the child, if permitted by another state law.'
6 7
Sampson's reassurances are not convincing. First, adoption is avail-
able as a mechanism for establishing paternity only if the father is willing
to adopt the child. 168 Thus, the availability of adoption is of no use to a
mother or state welfare agency that is attempting to establish the pater-
nity of an unwilling father in order to collect child support payments.
Second, Sampson's assertion that a nonmarital partner who con-
tributes sperm can be found not to be a donor if he and the mother in-
tended him to have parental rights is wholly without statutory support.
As discussed above, the plain language of RCW 26.26.011 indicates that
all men who provide sperm for assisted reproduction are donors, except
those who provide sperm for assisted reproduction by their wife. 16 9 An
exception for "intended parents" is contained nowhere in the statute and
could only follow as a product of creative judicial construction.
170
Furthermore, Sampson's interpretation conflicts with his very next anno-
tation, which quotes the Chair of the Drafting Committee as stating, "A
side of marriage, representing a step backward from the 1973 version ....
With respect to assisted reproduction, Article 7 precludes an unmarried part-
ner form [sic] establishing parentage based on his intentions, thereby leaving a
child born to an unmarried couple through assisted reproduction with only one
parent.
Sampson Annotations, supra note 140, at 161 n.73.
166. UPA (2000) § 102(8)(A) corresponds to RCW 26.26.01 1(8)(a) (which states, in part, that
a "donor" does not include a husband who provides sperm for the assisted reproduction of his wife).
Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(8)(A) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 304 (2001), with WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.26.01 1(8)(a) (2004).
167. Sampson Annotations, supra note 140, at 162 n.73.
168. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.190(1) (2004) (adoption proceeding is initiated upon the
filing of a petition for adoption by the prospective adoptive parent(s)); id § 26.26.080(2) (petition for
relinquishment of parental rights requires written consent of prospective adoptive parents).
169. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
170. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.011(8) (2004).
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donor under 702 is not a parent. So, if an unmarried woman participates
in assisted reproduction, she is the mother of the child. .... There would
be no father. That is the law we have today.'
71
In this sense, the WPA is retrogressive because former RCW
26.26.050(2) did contain an explicit exception for intended fathers: an
unmarried man could become the legal father of a child conceived
through assisted reproduction if he and the mother signed a written con-
sent prior to artificial insemination. 172 No such exception exists under the
current WPA. 73 Moreover, under the former WPA, even if the parents
failed to complete the paperwork prior to artificial insemination, the bio-
logical father could still be held responsible as a legal parent if he signed
an acknowledgment of paternity after the child's birth. 174 Under the cur-
rent WPA, however, the father of a nonmarital ART child cannot legally
sign an acknowledgment of paternity.
D. The WPA Precludes the Biological Father of a Nonmarital ART Child
from Signing an Acknowledgment ofPaternity
The current WPA precludes the biological father of a nonmarital
ART child from waiving his right to statutory protection as a sperm do-
nor by signing an acknowledgment of paternity. In order to sign an ac-
knowledgment of paternity under RCW 26.26.300,' a father must swear
under penalty of perjury that the child was conceived as the result of his
sexual intercourse with the mother.176 Because the biological father of an
ART child, by definition, did not conceive the child as a result of his
sexual intercourse with the mother, 177 signing an affidavit of paternity
would require him to commit perjury.
178
Thus, if the factual scenario presented in J.MK. had arisen under
the current WPA, the court could not have found that Kepl waived his
statutory protection as a sperm donor by signing a paternity affidavit for
John. Because John was conceived through ART, not sexual intercourse,
171. Sampson Annotations, supra note 140, at 163 n.74.
172. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (2000).
173. See id. §§ 26.26.01 1(8)(a), .26.705.
174. See In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 388-89, 119 P.3d 840, 847
(2005); see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
175. The corresponding provision in UPA (2000) is § 301. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 313 (2001).
176. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.300 (2004) ("The mother of a child and a man claiming to
be the father of the child conceived as the result of his sexual intercourse with the mother may sign
an acknowledgement of paternity.") (emphasis added); id. § 26.26.503(1)(b) ("An acknowledgment
of paternity must.. .[b]e signed under penalty of perjury.").
177. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.011(4) (2004) ("'Assisted reproduction' means a method
of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse.").
178. See id. §§ 26.26.300, .26.503(1)(b).
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Kepl's affidavit of paternity would have been perjured, and the court
could not have considered it in making a determination of legal pater-
nity.'
79
The purported justification for requiring a child's parents to swear
under penalty of perjury that the child was conceived through their sex-
ual intercourse is to prevent people from circumventing state adoption
laws or perpetrating fraud on the real genetic father. 80 However, given
that this goal can be accomplished just as easily by requiring the parents
to swear that the man is the genetic father of the child, there is no rational
justification for the peculiar requirement of sworn conception through
sexual intercourse.'
81
Although certainly debatable, the requirement of sworn conception
through sexual intercourse may have been included for reasons beyond a
simple desire to prevent "wholesale fraud."1 82 The recent heterosexual-
only marriage movement 83 appears to have heavily influenced the policy
decisions and statutory language chosen by the drafters of UPA (2000).
179. See id. §§ 26.26.300, .26.503(1)(b).
180. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 313-14 (2001), which
provides:
PRWORA [The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996] does not explicitly require that a man acknowledging parentage necessarily is as-
serting his genetic parentage of the child. In contrast, § 301 prevents circumvention of
adoption laws by requiring a sworn assertion of actual parentage of the child through
sexual intercourse in support of an acknowledgment under this article.
The PRWORA requirements for procedures involving voluntary paternity acknowledgments can be
found in 42 U.S.C. § 666(c). See 42 U.S.C. § 666(c) (2000). The only substantive requirement for
the signing of paternity acknowledgments contained in this statute is the requirement that "before a
mother and a putative father can sign an acknowledgment of paternity, the mother and the putative
father must be given notice ... of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the rights...
and responsibilities that arise from, signing the acknowledgment." Id.
181. Indeed, the former WPA only required the paternity affidavit to contain a sworn statement
by the father that he was the natural father. See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.58.080(4) (2000); see supra
notes 87 & 91. The 2002 Amendments replaced the requirement of sworn conception through sexual
intercourse with a requirement of sworn genetic relation. See infra Part IV.A.
182. Sampson Annotations, supra note 140, at Il1 n.18.
183. The influence of the heterosexual-marriage only movement on parentage laws related to
adoption and ART has been well-documented by Richard F. Storrow in Rescuing Children From the
Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted
Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006). Storrow describes the marriage movement as
follows:
The American marriage movement is a loose amalgam of initiatives reacting to the de-
cline of the heterosexual, marital, nuclear family .... The movement views heterosexual
marriage as central to societal integrity and aims to identify and dismantle or deflect any
forces that threaten its primacy .... In general, the movement targets any family system,
legal mechanism, or social force that undermines or stands as an alternative to heterosex-
ual marriage. Specific targets consist largely of manifestations of "individualism": no-
fault divorce, same-sex marriage, unmarried and single parenthood, and even step-parent
families.
Id. at 348 (internal citations omitted).
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For example, Professor Sampson's response to the ABA-IR&R let-
ter's complaint that UPA (2000) § 301184 violated the privacy of indi-
viduals and families is particularly revealing:
Admittedly the Drafting Committee never considered invading pri-
vacy as a consideration for requiring that a man who swears to an
acknowledgment must assert himself to be the genetic father of a
child through the standard means of acquiring that status. To adults
who do not believe in storks, it is a "DUH!" proposition that a man
acknowledging paternity is confessing sexual intercourse with the
mother . . . Only when it is understood that the ABA-IR&R con-
cers actually centered on protecting gay and lesbian rights does
this concern make any sense at all. The focus of this concern is the
gay man who seeks to assert paternity of a child but cannot honestly
swear the child was conceived through sexual intercourse with the
mother. Given the millions of out-of-wedlock children whose pater-
nity is yet to be established, many of whom were born to married
women and genetic fathers other than the women's husbands, the
IR&R Section has its priorities badly out of balance. The few gay
men in the fact situation described (perhaps hypothesized is a better
verb) have a ready alternative, to wit, a parentage suit under Article
6185 of this Act. The Conference, like Congress which created the
acknowledgement procedure, drafts statutes for the overwhelming
majority of likely cases, and not for the exceptions. Here, the ABA-
IR&R would have us focus on a relatively miniscule number of
cases to the detriment of the thousands of children born under these
circumstances.'
86
What is peculiar about Professor Sampson's response is that the
IR&R-ABA Letter's complaint about § 301 nowhere mentioned gay and
lesbian rights-its concern was centered upon individual privacy.
87
Even more peculiar, however, is Professor Sampson's failure to recog-
nize that heterosexual men, just as much as gay men, are precluded from
184. This provision corresponds to RCW 26.26.300. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.300
(2004).
185. Like the option of adoption, a parentage action (or "proceeding to adjudicate parentage")
under RCW 26.26.500-.630 is of no assistance to a mother or state welfare agency seeking to estab-
lish a duty of support upon the biological father of a nonmarital ART child because the plain lan-
guage of the WPA's provisions governing the parentage of ART children establish that he would be
considered a sperm donor at law. See id. §§ 26.26.011(8)(a), .26.705, .26.500-.630. A parentage
action might be a viable method of establishing the legal paternity of the nonmarital ART child's
biological father if both he and the mother agreed about his legal status; however, if the mother
contested the biological father's paternity suit, she would likely prevail by relying on the provisions
of RCW 26.26.01 l(8)(a) and RCW 26.26.705, for the reasons just stated. See id. §§ 26.26.01 l(8)(a),
.26.705.
186. Sampson Annotations, supra note 140, at 110-11 n. 18.
187. See id.
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signing paternity acknowledgments.1 88 One does not have to believe in
storks to realize that, given the rapid increase in the use of ART during
the last half of the twentieth century,' 89 a man acknowledging paternity is
not necessarily affirming that his child was conceived through the con-
ventional method of sexual intercourse. Given the tens of thousands of
ART children who are born each year, some of whom are inevitably born
to unmarried heterosexual couples through the use of ART,' 90 it is the
Drafting Committee who appears to have had its priorities out of balance
when it excluded all men who conceive children through assisted repro-
duction from signing paternity acknowledgments and prevented a "few
gay men"'191 from asserting genetic parentage of their children.
The suggestion that the Drafting Committee may have been influ-
enced by the heterosexual-marriage only movement is not intended to
imply in any way that the Drafting Committee was motivated by animus
towards gays and lesbians. Although the Committee made a conscious
policy decision to give special deference to married couples, 192 this deci-
sion was apparently motivated by the Committee's desire to draft legisla-
tion with a reasonable chance of being passed in state legislatures.193 The
Committee believed that legislation equalizing the parental rights of mar-
ried and unmarried couples-especially when unmarried couples could
include same sex couples-would not be well received in state legisla-
tures. 194 Thus, the special privileges given to married couples and the
188. See id.
189. See supra notes 335-41 and accompanying text.
190. See id. Disputed paternity cases involving nonmarital ART children conceived through
the use of non-anonymous sperm providers are frequently litigated. See, e.g., In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27
(Colo. 1989); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. 1977); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780
P.2d 239 (Or. App. 1989); In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 119 P.3d 840
(2005).
191. Sampson Annotations, supra note 140, at 110-11 n. 18.
192. See supra note 140.
193. See Uniform Parentage Act (2000) with Prefatory Note and Comments, 37 FAM. L.Q. 1,
92 (2001) ("'It is the purpose of the Conference to promote uniformity in the law among the several
states on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable.' As a practical matter, to
conserve limited resources NCCUSL seeks to draft legislation that has a reasonable chance of pas-
sage in several states, and does not engage its time or efforts in theoretical or abstract discussions of
legal principles.") (citing the NCCUSL Constitution). Professor Sampson emphasized in a telephone
interview with the author that the Drafting Committee had a very heavy representation of state legis-
lators (three were former state senators and others were very active in state legislation). Telephone
Interview with Professor John J. Sampson, Reporter, UPA (2000), University of Texas Law School
(Nov. 19, 2005).
194. Telephone Interview with Professor John J. Sampson, Reporter, UPA (2000), University
of Texas Law School, (Nov. 19, 2005). An example given by Professor Sampson as evidence of the
current hostile political climate was the recent passage of Defense of Marriage Acts in many states.
Id. See also Sampson Annotations, supra note 140, at 88 n.7. Sampson states the following:
Crucial to the concerns expressed in the ABA-IR&R letter, is the ALl (American Legal
Institute) principle that certain same-sex and opposite-sex unmarried couples should have
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legal disabilities imposed on nonmarital ART children under the WPA
can be seen as a by-product of America's marriage movement.
95
E. The Disparate Treatment of Marital and Nonmarital
Children is Bad Public Policy
The justification for privileging heterosexual marriage in this con-
text is often based on the belief that children do best when raised by mar-
ried, biological parents. 96 "[H]owever, the argument that privileging
heterosexual marriage is critical to ensuring the welfare of children falls
apart when it comes to light that some children will actually suffer under
such a myopic and rigidly exclusionary view of the value of marriage."
' ' 97
By denying innocent children like John and David an enforceable right
of support from their biological father merely because he failed to marry
their mother, the WPA has sacrificed the interests of nonmarital children
to a purely political cause. This is bad public policy.
First, denying nonmarital ART children an enforceable right of
support from their intended fathers directly contradicts Washington's
firmly established public policy of ensuring that the duty of parental sup-
port falls on both biological parents.' 98 The state has a compelling fiscal
concern in ensuring that parents who deliberately utilize ART to con-
ceive children bear the costs of raising these children. 199 "The law should
not aid fathers of unwed children to evade their responsibility in provid-
ing for the economic aspect of a stable environment. 2 °0
rights identical to married couples with regard to property division, alimony, and children
raised in the household. Such aspirations may eventually come to pass in this country; but
when, and even if, is wholly unpredictable at this time. The current legislative hostility to
that position is very clear to those of us who hang around state legislatures.
Id.
195. See generally Storrow, supra note 183.
196. Id. at 369.
197. Id.
198. See State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 100-02, 569 P.2d 1148, 1150-51 (1977) ("A parent's
obligation for the care and support of his or her child is a basic tenet recognized in this state without
reference to any particular statute .... The state has a compelling interest in assuring that the pri-
mary obligation for support of illegitimate children falls on both natural parents rather than on the
taxpayers of this state." (emphasis added)); Lizotte v. Lizotte, 15 Wash. App. 622, 626, 551 P.2d
137, 140 (1976) (it is clear in reason, as well as law, that the primary obligation for the support and
care of a child is on the parents who bring the child into the world rather than on the taxpayers of the
State.); accord State ex rel. Helms v. Rasch, 40 Wash. App. 241, 245, 698 P.2d 559, 561 (1985);
State v. Booth, 15 Wash. App. 804, 809, 551 P.2d 1403, 1406 (1975).
199. See In re Parentage of.J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 389, 119 P.3d 840, 847-48
(2005). As noted by Garrison, "children in single-parent households have a higher rate of poverty
and welfare dependence than any other segment of the American population." See Garrison, supra
note 35, at 887 (noting that the policy goal of providing children with two parents is based solely on
the belief that the interests of both children and the public are served by such a policy).
200. Nolan, supra note 59, at 66.
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Second, both the removal of the holding out provision and the im-
position of barriers to establishing the paternity of nonmarital ART chil-
dren contradict the public policy that favors providing children with two
legal parents whenever possible.201 It is true that a statutory scheme leav-
ing some children with only one legal parent is not necessarily defec-
tive.202 For example, one or both of a child's parents' rights may be ter-
minated in order to allow the child to be adopted by another couple or by
a single person.20 3 The State may also terminate one or both of a child's
parents' rights due to abuse or neglect.20 4 In State ex rel. D.R.M., the
court stated that the state may also block a paternity action based on the
205child's best interests, resulting in a single parent for the child. How-
ever, in each of these situations, the key factor considered is the child's
best interests.20 6 The choice of a single legal parent in these circum-
stances thus represents the view that one legal parent is in the child's best
interests, not the view that one legal parent is necessarily as good as
two. 207 It may well be that in some circumstances one legal parent is as
201. See Garrison, supra note 35, at 892; In re Marriage of Wendy M., 92 Wash. App. 430,
438, 962 P.2d 130, 133 (1998) (refusing to disestablish legal father's paternity despite genetic evi-
dence indicating that he was not the child's biological father because he was "the only father the
child has ever known" and the mother had never publicly or privately identified any other man as the
father); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46, 56 (Super. Ct. 2005) ("By recognizing the
value of determining paternity, the Legislature implicitly recognized the value of having two parents,
rather than one, as a source of both emotional and financial support, especially when the obligation
to support the child would otherwise fall to the public."); Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 194
(Ct. App. 2005) ("[W]henever possible, a child should have the benefit of two parents to support and
nurture him or her.") (emphasis in original). As stated by the California Court of Appeals in
Clevenger v. Clevenger:
[T]here is an innate immorality in the conduct of an adult who ... accepts and proclaims
a child as his own, but then, in order to be relieved of the child's support, announces and
relies upon his bastardy. This is a cruel weapon which works a lasting injury to the child
and can bring in its aftermath social harm.
11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1961).
202. State ex rel. D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. 182, 190, 34 P.3d 887, 892 (2001).
203. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.33.080, .33.090(4), .33.140 (2004).
204. See D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. at 190, 34 P.3d at 892; WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.190
(2004).
205. D.R.M, 109 Wash. App. at 190, 34 P.3d at 892. Ironically, the court cites as support for
this proposition McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 310, 738 P.2d 254, 261 (1987), which
involved a child with a mother and two father figures, each of whom very much wanted to be the
child's legal father. McDaniels, 108 Wash. 2d at 301-03, 738 P.2d at 256.
206. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.010 (2004) (stating that the purpose of adoption is to
provide stable homes for adopted children and that the guiding principle must be determining what is
in the best interest of the child); id. § 13.34.190(2) (court may enter order terminating parental rights
only if the order is in the best interests of the child); McDaniels, 108 Wash. 2d at 310, 738 P.2d at
261 (stating, in dicta, "it is possible that in some circumstances a child's interests will be even better
served by no paternity determination at all," and citing sealed adoption records as such an example).
207. See Garrison, supra note 35, at 907.
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good as two; 20 8 however, "[s]uch cases simply cannot justify a policy that
will invariably deprive technologically-conceived children of two legal
parents. 2 °9
Third, imposing legal disabilities on nonmarital ART children will
not stop unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples from using
ART to conceive children. 210 The California Court of Appeals once fa-
mously pleaded for legislation concerning the parentage of ART children
for this reason:
No matter what one thinks of [artificial reproduction] courts are
still going to be faced with the problem of determining lawful
parentage. A child cannot be ignored. Even if all means of artifi-
cial reproduction were outlawed with draconian criminal penal-
ties visited on the doctors and parties involved, courts will still
be called upon to decide who the lawful parents really are and
who-other than the taxpayers-is obligated to provide mainte-
211nance and support for the child. These cases will not go away.
Interestingly, if discouraging the use of ART outside the context of
212marriage was indeed the motivation behind the discriminatory statutes,
then the Washington legislature created a large loophole by choosing to
retain the state's previously existing surrogacy statutes rather than adopt
UPA (2000)'s Article Eight, Gestational Agreements. 21 3 Washington's
surrogacy laws do not facially discriminate against unmarried couples or
the children they conceive through surrogacy.2 14 It is true that an unmar-
ried man who provides his own sperm for assisted reproduction pursuant
to a surrogacy contract would be precluded from establishing himself as
208. One such circumstance could be single-motherhood-by-choice. See generally Bock, supra
note 99. Some institutions and commentators vehemently oppose single-motherhood-by-choice
based on their belief that it is harmful to children's welfare. See Storrow, supra note 183, at 313 n.35
(citing examples). However, these arguments are flawed because they suffer from the "non-identity
problem" made famous by philosopher Derek Parfit. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and
Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8 (2004) (discussing DEREK
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS ch. 16 (1984)). Presumably, many women who currently become
single-mothers-by-choice through the use of sperm donors would not do so without the belief that
they will be the child's sole legal parent. For this reason, a prohibition against single-motherhood-
by-choice, which mandates that all sperm providers-both known and anonymous-be liable for
their biological children, would not benefit the children of single-mothers-by-choice because these
children would have never been bom in the first place. See id.
209. Garrison, supra note 35, at 907 (emphasis added).
210. See supra notes 33-41, 190 and accompanying text.
211. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998).
212. See supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
213. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 360-370 (2001); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 26.26.101(f), .26.210-.260 (2004); Sampson (2002), supra note 55, at 4. See supra
note 55 for a brief description of Washington's surrogacy laws.
214. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.101(f), .26.210-.260 (2004); see supra note 55.
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
the child's legal father unless he adopted the child, because the biological
father of a nonmarital ART child is an automatic sperm donor.215 How-
ever, an unmarried man who arranged for donor sperm to be used for the
assisted reproduction of a surrogate could be established as the child's
legal father regardless of whether he entered into the surrogacy agree-
ment with the surrogate by himself, or with his heterosexual or homo-
sexual partner. 2 16 It is utterly irrational to preclude an unmarried man
from being established as the legal father of an ART child simply be-
cause he provided his own sperm to conceive the child, while simultane-
ously facilitating the establishment of paternity for an unmarried man so
long as the child was conceived using donor sperm and a surrogate.
Finally, even granting that these regulations might discourage some
unmarried parents from using ART to conceive children because of the
legal uncertainty surrounding the biological father's parental rights and
responsibilities, this statutory scheme is a highly ineffectual and unjust
method of deterring unmarried couples from utilizing ART. This type of
deterrence was explicitly rejected as both inappropriate and unconstitu-
tional by the United States Supreme Court in Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages soci-
ety's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant
is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the il-
legitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual re-
sponsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible
for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffec-
tual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent.217
Thus, the current statutory scheme conflicts with the established
public policies of holding parents accountable and providing for the best
interests of children, and penalizes children based on the marital status of
their biological parents in a manner that has not been seen since the early
1970's, before UPA (1973) and the former WPA were enacted for the
specific purpose of equalizing the rights of marital and nonmarital chil-
dren.
2 18
215. See supra Part 11I.B-D.
216. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210-.260 (2004) (containing no gender- or sexual orien-
tation-based restrictions on surrogacy agreements); State ex. rel. D.R.M., 109 Wash. App. 182, 190,
34 P.3d 887, 892 (2001) (stating that the surrogacy statute does not limit surrogacy to two-parent
families).
217. 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (internal citations omitted).
218. See supra Part I.C.
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F. The WPA Violates the Equal Protection Clause
Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered
by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does
enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of
birth where . . . the classification is justified by no legitimate
state interest, compelling or otherwise." 9
The WPA's statutory scheme for parentage of ART children, which
categorically bars the biological fathers of nonmarital ART children from
being established as their children's legal father under the Act, violates
the federal Equal Protection Clause.22 0 Since Levy v. Louisiana,22 the
219. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983) (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76 (1972) (foot-
notes omitted)).
220. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws .... "). The discriminatory provisions of the WPA may also
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Washington State Constitution. See WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 12 ("No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation
other than municipal, privileges and immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong
to all citizens, or corporations."). The current state of the law with respect to this provision is unset-
tled, however. Historically, Washington's Privileges and Immunities Clause has been treated as
substantially identical to the federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. ROBERT F. UTTER AND
HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 27 (2002). But
in Grant County the Washington State Supreme Court concluded that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause "requires a separate and independent constitutional analysis from the United States Constitu-
tion." Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wash. 2d 791, 806,
83 P.3d 419, 425 (2004) (applying State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 810-11
(1986) (emphasis added)). Although the court recently revisited this issue in Anderson v. King
County, Nos. 75934-1, 75956-1, 2006 WL 2073138 (Wash. July 26, 2006), the justices did not agree
on the circumstances under which this "separate and independent analysis" should be undertaken.
See id. at *7 ("[A]n independent state analysis applies under article 1, § 12 only where the chal-
lenged law grants a privilege or immunity to a minority class, i.e., in the event of positive favorit-
ism.") (plurality opinion); id. at *78 ("There is nothing in [the] cases or the authorities [relied upon
by the plurality] that should lead to the conclusion that the class receiving the benefit must be a
minority class before we will independently examine our state constitution.") (Chambers, J., dissent-
ing). Because of this uncertainty, the analysis below assumes that the federal Equal Protection
Clause would govern a challenge to the WPA's failure to provide nonmarital ART children with an
enforceable right to paternal support from their biological, intended fathers.
Another potential constitutional challenge, which is beyond the scope of this Comment, is the
argument that the WPA violates the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") to the Washington State
Constitution, WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1, by discriminating against nonmarital ART fathers solely on
the basis of their sex. See In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 697-98 (Tex. 1987) (holding that Texas
parentage statutes violated the ERA of the Texas Constitution because, while mothers of nonmarital
children automatically had parental rights and responsibilities, fathers of nonmarital children could
obtain parental rights and responsibilities only if the mother consented). Under the WPA, a woman
who gives birth to a nonmarital ART child is automatically entitled to parental rights and responsi-
bilities, except in the context of surrogacy. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.01 l(8)(b) (2004). How-
ever, the biological father of a nonmarital ART child cannot be established as the legal father unless
the mother consents to him adopting the child. See discussion supra Part III.B-D.
221. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Levy was the first case to hold that a statutory classification based on
"illegitimacy" violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 71; Nolan, supra note 59, at 10 n.5 1.
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Supreme Court has decided over thirty additional cases involving non-
marital children and their parents.222 In many of these cases, the Court's
"special concern for discrimination against illegitimate children ' 223 led
them to find that classifications based on illegitimacy violated the Equal
Protection Clause.224 Although the Court originally had difficulty agree-
ing upon the appropriate standard of review for discriminatory classifica-
225tions based on illegitimacy, the Court has since settled upon an "inter-
mediate" level of scrutiny. 226 "To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a
statutory classification must be substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental objective. 227 The WPA's statutory scheme for parentage of
ART children discriminates on the basis of illegitimacy and cannot with-
stand intermediate scrutiny.
222. See Nolan, supra note 59 at 1. See id. at I n. I for a full list and brief description of each
case.
223. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983). As stated in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505
(1976), "illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by
causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's
ability to participate in and contribute to society."
224. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1998); Pickett, 462 U.S. at 18; Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91 (1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v. American Guarantee Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72. The Supreme Court has declined to determine whether
a child has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in her relationship with her biological father.
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) ("We have never had occasion to de-
cide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her
filial relationship. We need not do so here.").
225. See, e.g., Mathews, 427 U.S. at 510 (rejecting strict scrutiny but stating that the standard
of review was "not a toothless one."); Gomez 409 U.S. at 538 (appearing to apply strict scrutiny);
Weber, 406 U.S. 164, 172 (applying "stricter scrutiny"); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536
(1971) (applying rational basis review); Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72 (appearing to apply an unspecified
form of strict scrutiny).
226. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. The unanimous Court in Clark laid out a three-tiered standard
of review for discriminatory classifications:
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, we apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifica-
tions. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. Classifications based on race or national origin, and classifica-
tions affecting fundamental rights, are given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these
extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny,
which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or ille-
gitimacy.
227. Id.
Washington's 2002 Parentage Act
1. The WPA Contains a Classification Based on Illegitimacy
and is Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny
The WPA provisions governing the parentage of ART children re-
strict nonmarital ART children's right to paternal support on the basis of
illegitimacy and are therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. In Wash-
ington, there is a long-standing rule that a parent is the biological mother
or father of his or her child and has a duty to support that child regardless
of the marital status of the parents.22 8 With respect to paternity, the WPA
creates a broad exception to this longstanding rule: all biological fathers
of nonmarital ART children are sperm donors, regardless of intent to be a
parent. 229 Because the duty of support does not arise until legal paternity
is established,23 ° the result of this exception is that all nonmarital ART
children are foreclosed from seeking paternal support from their biologi-
cal fathers under the Act.
One might argue that the WPA does not discriminate against non-
marital ART children because neither nonmarital nor marital ART
children have any right to paternal support from sperm donors,231 and
therefore, nonmarital ART children are not being treated any differently
than marital ART children. This argument, however, is tautological and
substantively inaccurate because, under the WPA, a nonmarital ART fa-
ther by definition is a sperm donor 232 and a marital ART father by
definition is not a sperm donor.233 The definition of "donor" under the
WPA is itself the source of the disparate treatment. Thus, while ART
children born to married biological parents have an enforceable right to
support from both parents, ART children born to unmarried biological
parents do not have an enforceable right to paternal support because their
biological fathers are automatically considered sperm donors under the
228. In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 389, 119 P.3d 840, 847-48
(2005).
229. See supra Part III.C.
230. See Pippins v. Jankelson, 110 Wash. 2d 475, 478, 754 P.2d 105, 107 (1988) ("The court's
power to modify child support is of course dependent upon a prior determination of paternity."); In
re Doe, 38 Wash. App. 251, 254, 684 P.2d 1368, 1370 (1984) (holding that, prior to a judicial de-
termination of paternity, there is no duty of support on the part of a putative father); State v. Booth,
15 Wash. App. 804, 808, 551 P.2d 1403, 1406 (1976) (holding that "once it is determined in an
appropriate legal proceeding that a man is the father of a child born out of wedlock, his consequent
obligation to provide support, maintenance, care and education for that child is the same as if his
child had been born in lawful wedlock."). But see Kaur v. Chawla, 11 Wash. App. 362, 522 P.2d
1198 (1974) (holding that a putative father has a duty of support that can be enforced even without a
formal determination of paternity).
231. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.705 (2004) ("A donor is not a parent of a child conceived
by means of assisted reproduction.").
232. See id. § 26.26.011(8) (discussed supra Part IG).
233. See id. § 26.26.01 l(8)(a) (a donor does not include a husband who provides sperm to be
used for assisted reproduction by the wife).
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law.234 Thus, like the statue in Pickett, the WPA treats "some illegitimate
children . . . differently from, and less favorably than, legitimate chil-
dren. 235
2. The WPA's Discriminatory Classification Fails Intermediate Scrutiny
The disparate treatment of marital and nonmarital ART children
under the WPA cannot sustain intermediate scrutiny because nonmarital
ART children are not provided with an adequate opportunity to obtain
paternal support and because the disparate treatment is not substantially
related to any important governmental objective.
In Gomez, the Court concluded that:
[A] State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate chil-
dren by denying them substantial benefits accorded children gener-
ally .... Once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf
of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no
constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential
right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its
mother.236
However, the Court simultaneously recognized the possibility that
"lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity" might in some
cases justify differential treatment of nonmarital children.237 For exam-
ple, state statutes of limitations restricting paternity suits on behalf of
nonmarital children may be constitutional if shown to be substantially
related to the legitimate state interest of avoiding stale or fraudulent
claims.238 In Mills, the Court explained this exception as follows:
The fact that [a state] must provide illegitimate children with a bona
fide opportunity to obtain paternal support does not mean, however,
that it must adopt procedures for illegitimate children that are co-
terminous with those accorded legitimate children. Paternal support
suits on behalf of illegitimate children contain an element that such
suits for legitimate children do not contain: proof of paternity. Such
234. See id §§ 26.26.705, .26.011(8).
235. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 12 (1983). The ability of nonmarital, non-ART children
to establish legal paternity under the WPA and to obtain paternal support does not alter the analysis
of whether the WPA provisions governing the parentage of ART children contain a classification
based on illegitimacy that is subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
504 n. 1 (1976) ("That the statutory classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate
children does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as discriminating be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children.").
236. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. Pickett, 462 U.S. at 8; see also Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
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proof is often sketchy and strongly contested, frequently turning
upon conflicting testimony from only two witnesses.
239
The Court has made very clear, however, that such procedural re-
strictions cannot "be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to
shield otherwise invidious discrimination. "
240
Thus, to the extent that the WPA's categorical bar to establishing
legal paternity for nonmarital ART children under the Act reflects a sub-
stantive rule of law that nonmarital ART children are never entitled to
support from their biological fathers, while marital ART children are al-
ways entitled to such support, the WPA violates the Equal Protection
Clause because "a State which grants an opportunity for legitimate chil-
dren to obtain paternal support must also grant that opportunity to ille-
gitimate children." 241 The State cannot deprive a nonmarital ART child
of a right granted to marital ART children generally "simply because its
natural father has not married its mother.,
242
Even to the extent that the WPA's ART provisions can be framed
as merely establishing different procedures for determining the paternity
of marital and nonmarital ART children,24 3 the provisions must still pro-
vide an adequate opportunity for nonmarital ART children to obtain pa-
ternal support, and the provisions must be substantially related to an im-
portant governmental interest. This two-part test for the constitutionality
of procedural restrictions on nonmarital children's right to paternal sup-
port is derived from the Court's jurisprudence relating to state statutes of
limitations that limit the time during which paternity suits for nonmarital
children can be filed.244 The test for evaluating the constitutionality of
such statutes of limitations was explained in Mills:
First, the period for obtaining support granted by [the state] to il-
legitimate children must be sufficiently long in duration to pre-
239. 456 U.S. at 97 (1982) (emphasis added). In Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 463 (1988), the
Court acknowledged that this justification for disparate treatment had weakened because of scientific
advances in blood testing, which alleviated some of the problems of proof in paternity actions.
240. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538. Since Gomez, the Court has decided three additional cases in-
volving restrictions on nonmarital children's rights to paternal support in the form of state statutes of
limitations; in each case, the Court held that the statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause. See
Clark, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (unanimous ruling); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983) (unanimous
ruling); Mills, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982) (authored by Justice Rehnquist, with Justices O'Connor,
Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell concurring). Because the Court decided the constitutionality of the
statutes on equal protection grounds, the Court declined to address the parties' due process argu-
ments. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 465; Pickett, 462 U.S. at 12 n. 11; Mills, 456 U.S. at 97.
241. Mills, 456 U.S. at 97 (emphasis added).
242. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538.
243. See infra notes 256-57 for discussion of the discriminatory classification's possible pro-
cedural function as a proxy for proof of intent to be a parent of an ART child.
244. See cases cited supra note 240.
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sent a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such
children to assert claims on their behalf. Second, any time limita-
tion placed on that opportunity must be substantially related to
the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent
claims.
245
Although the Court has not evaluated procedural restrictions on
nonmarital children's rights to paternal support outside of the context of
statutes of limitations, the two principle constitutional requirements--(1)
nonmarital children must be provided an adequate opportunity to obtain
paternal support, and (2) restrictions on nonmarital children's right to
support must be substantially related to an important governmental inter-
est-are likely to apply in other contexts as well.246 Unfortunately, the
WPA provisions governing the parentage of ART children fail to satisfy
either requirement.
First, nonmarital ART children are not provided with an adequate
opportunity to establish paternity and obtain paternal support. As dis-
cussed above, because the biological father of a nonmarital ART child is
automatically a sperm donor under the WPA, he cannot be established as
the legal father under the Act, and therefore he cannot be obligated to
support the child.247 Although it could be argued that a nonmarital ART
child is not precluded from obtaining paternal support because the child's
biological father could become the legal father through adoption, this
type of truncated opportunity was soundly rejected in Mills:
If Gomez and the equal protection principles which underlie it are to
have any meaning, it is clear that the support opportunity provided
by the State to illegitimate children must be more than illusory ....
By granting illegitimate children only one year in which to establish
paternity, Texas has failed to provide them with an adequate oppor-
tunity to obtain support.
248
A statutory scheme that requires the biological father of a nonmari-
tal ART child to go through the time-consuming and expensive process
of adoption in order to become the child's legal father provides an oppor-
tunity to obtain paternal support that is just as illusory, if not more illu-
sory, than the truncated one-year statute of limitations in Mills. 249 Fur-
245. Mills, 456 U.S. at 99-100; see also Pickett, 462 U.S. at 18 ("The two-year limitations
period established by [the statute] does not provide certain illegitimate children with an adequate
opportunity to obtain support and is not substantially related to the legitimate state interest in pre-
venting the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. It therefore denies certain illegitimate children the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
246. See Dwyer, supra note 101, at 1072.
247. See supra Part III.C; see supra note 230 and accompanying text.
248. 456 U.S. at 97, 100.
249. See id.
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thermore, a statute that makes the child's right to paternal support en-
tirely contingent upon the father's decision to voluntarily undertake fi-
nancial liability is unreasonable because the child's interests and the
father's interests are not congruent.25°
Second, the WPA's differential treatment between marital and non-
marital ART children is not substantially related to any legitimate state
interest. Three potential state interests are served by the discriminatory
provisions in the WPA. First, the state may have an interest in dis-
couraging the use of ART outside the context of marriage. 25 As dis-
cussed above, this type of deterrence is bad public policy. 252 More impor-
tantly, however, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this type of state
interest as a justification for statutes that discriminate against nonmarital
children: "important as such a state interest might be, we have repeatedly
held that imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our legal system that burdens should bear some relation-
ship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.2 53
The next state interest relates to the "lurking problems with respect
to proof of paternity.' 254 The legislature, by adopting statutes that shield
gamete donors from parental liability, has evinced acceptance of ART as
an appropriate method of procreation and has indicated that individuals
should be allowed to terminate their parental rights and responsibilities
when they donate sperm or eggs to enable other individuals to conceive
children.25 5 The state may therefore have a valid, important interest in
ensuring that individuals who donate gametes with the intent to terminate
their parental rights are not held liable for the children conceived with
their gametes. Similarly, the state may have a legitimate state interest in
ensuring that individuals who utilize ART to conceive children are pro-
tected from any future parentage claims by gamete donors. Therefore,
one might argue, in order to protect the interests of both gamete donors
250. See id. at 106 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The possibility of [the unwillingness of the
mother] to file suit underscores that the mother's and child's interests are not congruent, and illus-
trates the unreasonableness of the Texas statute of limitation."); see also Pickett, 462 U.S. at 16 n. 15.
Although Mills and Pickett discuss the divergence of a child's interests and his or her mother's inter-
ests in establishing paternity, the interests of a putative father are arguably even less likely to be
congruent with those of his nonmarital children.
251. See Mills, 456 U.S. at 101 n.8 (acknowledging that a state may have a legitimate "interest
in the continuation of the institutions of family and marriage and the avoidance of any state actions
that would discourage either institution or ... encourage persons to have children out of wedlock."
(internal quotations omitted)).
252. See supra Part III.E.
253. Mills, 456 U.S. at 101 n.8 (internal quotations omitted); see also Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
254. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
255. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.011(3)(c), (4),
(8)..26.101()(d). (1)(e). (2)(3). (2)(f). .26.210-.260..26.700-.740 (2004).
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and gamete users, proof of paternity should require proof of intent to be a
parent.
Seen in this light, the classification based on the marital status of an
ART child's biological parents has a procedural function as a proxy for
proof of intent. While a married man providing sperm for assisted repro-
duction by his wife is presumed not to intend to sever his parental rights
and responsibilities,256 an unmarried man providing sperm for assisted
reproduction is presumed to intend to sever his rights and responsibili-
ties. 257 Thus, by utilizing a conclusive presumption that only married
men intend to be parents of children conceived through ART, the state
may be attempting to further the legitimate state interest of assigning pa-
rental liability to only the intended parents of ART children.
This argument fails, however, because the marital status of an ART
child's parents is an inappropriate proxy for proof of parental intent.
While it may be true that all married men who provide sperm for assisted
reproduction by their wives intend to be the legal father of their resulting
children, it is not true that all unmarried men who provide sperm for as-
sisted reproduction intend not to be the legal father of their resulting
children.258  The WPA's classification is thus substantially
underinclusive: it purports to further the goal of aligning parental
responsibility for ART children with parental intent, yet it fails to hold
any intended fathers of nonmarital ART children responsible for children
that they purposefully conceive.
Furthermore, the strength of the state's interest in assigning parental
liability only to individuals who actually intend to be parents of ART
children is "undercut by the countervailing state interest in ensuring that
genuine claims for child support are satisfied., 259 As stated in State v.
Wood, "[t]he state has a compelling interest in assuring that the primary
obligation for support of illegitimate children falls on both natural
256. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.710 (2004) ("If a husband provides sperm for, or consents
to, assisted reproduction by his wife ... he is the father of a resulting child born to his wife.").
257. See id § 26.26.705. ("A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction."); see also id. § 26.26.011 (8)(a) (A male donor is anyone who provides sperm for
assisted reproduction except a husband providing sperm to be used for assisted reproduction by his
wife.) (emphasis added).
258. See, e.g., In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 119 P.3d 840 (2005);
In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. 1977);
McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. App. 1989). Indeed, sometimes unmarried men even intend
to be the father of nonmarital ART children who are not conceived using their own sperm. See, e.g.,
Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 2000); In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (111.
2003).
259. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (quoting Mills v. Habuetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 103
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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parents rather than on the taxpayers of this state. ,260 Because of the
strength of this countervailing policy, Washington has refused to allow
lack of intent to serve as a defense to child support obligations for non-
marital children conceived through sexual intercourse, even when the
father is "tricked" by the mother into believing that she is infertile or us-
ing birth control and cannot become pregnant. 26' Given this countervail-
ing public policy, along with the troubling underinclusiveness of the
statutory classification, the state's legitimate interest in assigning paren-
tal responsibility only to intended parents of ART children does not ap-
pear to be substantially related to a statutory scheme that equates the
marital status of the biological parents with proof of intent to be legal
parents.
Finally, the state has a legitimate interest in administrative conven-
ience, which may be served by a conclusive presumption that biological
fathers of nonmarital ART children do not intend to be legal fathers. In
Mathews, the Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the Social
Security Act governing insurance benefits eligibility for deceased wage
earners' children did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.262 These
provisions required select sub-classes of nonmarital children to prove
actual dependency on their deceased parent in order to be eligible for
benefits, but presumed dependency for marital children and other sub-
classes of nonmarital children.263 The Court reasoned that "presumptions
in aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather
than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication would
show, are permissible... so long as that lack of precise equivalence does
not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable level
of scrutiny.''264 The Court then held that the Congress's interest in admin-
istrative convenience was sufficient to justify the challenged statutory
classifications, concluding that the classifications were "justified as rea-
sonable empirical judgments."
265
Key to the Court's decision, however, was its finding that the
challenged classification was narrowly tailored and did not conclusively
deny benefits to some class of nonmarital children: "conclusiveness in
denying benefits to some classes of ... illegitimate children ... is absent
here ... the statute does not broadly discriminate between legitimates
260. 89 Wash. 2d 97, 102, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977).
261. See Linda D. v. Fritz C., 38 Wash. App. 288, 687 P.2d 223 (1984).
262. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976).
263. Id. at 497-99.
264. Id. at 509.
265. Id. at 510.
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and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative con-
siderations.,
266
In contrast to the provisions in Mathews, which withheld the pre-
sumption of dependency only in the absence of any significant evidence
of the likelihood of actual dependency, 267 the WPA categorically with-
holds the presumption of intent to be a parent for all biological fathers of
nonmarital ART children, regardless of potentially irrefutable evidence
of their actual intent to be a parent. 68
The WPA is thus similar to the statutory schemes previously invali-
dated by the Supreme Court, under which, "not only was the legitimate
child automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate child was de-
nied benefits solely and finally on the basis of illegitimacy., 269 Adminis-
trative convenience thus does not justify legislation that unduly burdens
certain categories of illegitimate children. 
270
In sum, the WPA forms a nearly impenetrable barrier to the estab-
lishment of paternity for nonmarital ART children-a barrier that is not
substantially related to any important state interest. 27 The constitutional
266. Id. at 512-13; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977) (noting that these
considerations were central to the Court's decision in Mathews).
267. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 513. Evidence of actual dependency included evidence that the
insured parent was living with the child or contributed to the child's support at the time of death. Id.
at 495.
268. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.011(8), .26.705 (2004).
269. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 511.
270. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770-71 ("The court failed to consider the possibility of a middle
ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity...
. Because it excludes those categories of illegitimate children unnecessarily, [the statute] is constitu-
tionally flawed.").
271. One potential, although not preferable, way that the WPA might be made constitutional is
through judicial recognition of a nonmarital ART child's common law right to paternal support from
his or her intended father. See In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash. 2d 679, 688-701, 122 P.3d 161,
166-73 (2005); In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 151-52 (111. 2003). In L.B., the court rec-
ognized that "the UPA ... was intended to supplement and clarify parentage actions and not to sup-
plant the common law equity powers of our trial courts with regard to parentage, visitation, child
custody, and support." 115 Wash. 2d at 701, 122 P.3d at 173. Further, the court noted that "our state
is especially concerned with the interests of children, whether those interests arise within or outside
the confines of a marital relationship and . . . that such interests continue to be protected and re-
dressed through statutory and common law actions." Id. at 701 n.22, 122 P.3d at 173 (emphasis in
original). Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court has signaled that it will not hesitate to protect
the rights of nonmarital children when the legislature has failed to do so. It is questionable, however,
whether recognition of a nonmarital ART child's common law right to paternal support from his or
her intended father would constitute an adequate opportunity to obtain paternal support. See discus-
sion supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text. Given that every case involving an unsupportive
father may require years of expensive litigation in order to obtain support, it is likely that many
nonmarital ART children would be unable to realize the benefits of this common law right. Further-
more, even if recognizing this common law right would create an adequate opportunity to obtain
support, the discriminatory provisions of the WPA would arguably remain unconstitutional because
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infirmity of laws that improperly burden the establishment of legal pater-
nity for nonmarital ART children has previously been recognized by the
Washington State Supreme Court. 27 2 The legislature would therefore be
wise to revisit the ART provisions of the WPA in order to cure them of
their constitutional deficiencies. As discussed in Part IV, the amend-
ments of UPA (2002) would provide a ready solution.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE WPA
This Part analyzes several key amendments promulgated by
NCCUSL in UPA (2002) and recommends that Washington adopt them
in order to cure the deficiencies of the WPA.273 As detailed above,2 74 af-
ter NCCUSL failed to secure the ABA's approval of UPA (2000), the
Drafting Committee reconsidered their controversial decision to give
"special deference" to married couples.2 75 After negotiating with the
ABA entities,2 76 the Drafting Committee conceded that the Act's dispa-
rate treatment of marital and nonmarital children was undesirable:
Key to the agreed settlement is that a child born to an unmarried
man and woman, including children born through assisted reproduc-
tion or in the context of a gestational agreement, should have the
same rights and relationship with his or her parents or intended par-
ents as a child born to a married couple.
277
The 2002 Amendments thus reflect a concern for the best interests of
nonmarital children as well as marital children278 and should be carefully
considered by the Washington legislature.
A. Washington Should Amend the Statute Governing
Paternity Acknowledgments
First, Washington should replace the current language of RCW
26.26.300279 with the amended language of UPA (2002) § 301 .280 Section
they are not substantially related to any legitimate state interest. See discussion supra notes 253-270
and accompanying text.
272. See In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 390, 119 P.3d 840, 848
(2005); Armijo v. Wesselus, 73 Wash. 2d 716, 721, 440 P.2d 471, 473-74 (1968).
273. This Part does not discuss all of the UPA (2002) Amendments, but focuses only on those
directly related to the issues considered in this Comment. The author is of the opinion, however, that
all applicable amendments should be considered by the Washington legislature.
274. See supra note 140.
275. Sampson (2002), supra note 54, at 2-3.
276. See supra note 140.
277. Sampson (2002), supra note 54, at 2-3.
278. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2005).
279. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.300 (2004); see discussion supra notes 88-90 and accompany-
ing text.
280. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301, 9B U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 2005).
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301 replaces the requirement of sworn sexual intercourse in an acknowl-
edgment of paternity with a requirement of sworn genetic relation: "[t]he
mother of a child and a man claiming to be the genetic father of the child
may sign an acknowledgment of paternity., 28' The official comment to
§ 301 explains the purpose of amending the provision:
In order to prevent circumvention of adoption laws, § 301 . . . [re-
quires] a man who signs an acknowledgment of paternity [to] de-
clare[] that he is the genetic father of the child. Thus, both the man
and the mother acknowledge his paternity, under penalty of perjury,
without requiring the parents to spell out the details of their sexual
relations. Further, the amended language also takes into account a
situation in which a man, who is unable to have sexual intercourse
with his partner, may still have contributed to the conception of the
282child through the use of his own sperm.
The amendment does more, however, than just allow the biological
father of a nonmarital ART child who is unable to have sexual inter-
course with his partner to sign a paternity acknowledgement. The
amendment also allows the biological father of a nonmarital ART child
who is unable to conceive a child through sexual intercourse with his
heterosexual partner to sign a paternity acknowledgement. 283 In other
words, the amendment allows the intended, biological father of a non-
marital ART child, who has conceived the child with his heterosexual
partner using ART because of infertility problems, to sign a paternity
acknowledgment.
Thus, if Washington adopted the amended language of § 301, a
court would have no trouble finding that, in the factual scenario of
J.MK., Kepl was the legal father of John because he signed an acknowl-
284edgement of his paternity. Under RCW 26.26.320, which would not be
amended, "a valid acknowledgment of paternity ... is equivalent to an
281. Id. A red-lined copy of the UPA (2002) amendments is available in Amendments to the
Uniform Parentage Act as Last Amended in 2002 With Prefatory Notes and Comments, 37 FAM.
L.Q. 5, 5-34 (2003) [hereinafter Amendments to the UPA]. For example, in Amendments to the
UPA, the revised UPA (2002) § 301 appears as follows:
Section 301. Acknowledgment of Paternity. The mother of a child and a man claiming to
be the genetic father of the child eneived. as the result Pf his cexual intereurete with the
nte may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with intent to establish the man's pa-
ternity.
Id. at 17-18.
282. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 cmt., 9B U.L.A.19 (Supp. 2005).
283. See id. § 301, 9B U.L.A.19 (Supp. 2005).
284. See id.; In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 379-80, 119 P.3d 840,
842-43 (2005).
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adjudication of paternity of a child and confers upon the acknowledged
father all of the rights and duties of a parent.
285
B. Washington Should Amend the WPA to Allow the Biological Father of
a Nonmarital ART Child to be Established as the Child's Legal Father
Second, Washington should adopt a version of UPA (2002) § 703286
and UPA (2002) § 704287 to replace the current language of RCW
26.26.7 10288 and RCW 26.26.715,28 9 respectively. Section 703 states that
"[a] man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction
by a woman as provided in § 704 with the intent to be the parent of her
child, is a parent of the resulting child., 290 Section 704 specifies that,
"[c]onsent by a woman, and a man who intends to be a parent of a child
born to the woman by assisted reproduction must be in a record signed
by the woman and the man.",29' If the man fails to sign a consent, he may
285. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.320 (2004).
286. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, 9B U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2005).
287. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704, 9B U.L.A. 40-41 (Supp. 2005).
288. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.710 (2004). The statute currently provides:
Husband's paternity of child of assisted reproduction.
If a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by his
wife as provided in RCW 26.26.715, he is the father of a resulting child born
to his wife.
Id.
289. Id. § 26.26.715. The statute currently provides:
Consent to Assisted Reproduction.
(1) A consent to assisted reproduction by a married woman must be in a re-
cord signed by the woman and her husband. This requirement does not apply
to the donation of eggs for assisted reproduction by another woman.
(2) Failure of the husband to sign a consent required by subsection (I) of this
section, before or after birth of the child, does not preclude a finding that the
husband is the father of a child born to his wife if the wife and husband openly
treated the child as their own.
Id.
290. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, 9B U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2005). Section 703 has been amended
as follows:
Section 703 Iusband's paternity of child of assisted reproduction.
A man who fa.hsa.d provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduc-
tion by a woman his-wife as provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the
parent of her child, is a parent of the, he is the father of a resulting child.
Amendments to the UPA, supra note 281, at 23.
291. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(a), 9B U.L.A. 40-41 (Supp. 2005). Section 704 has been
amended as follows:
Section 704 Consent to Assisted Reproduction.
(a) Consent by a FAroaied woman. and a man who intends to be a parent of a
child born to the woman by to assisted reproduction must be in a record
signed by the woman and the man her husband. This requirement does not ap-
ply to a donor the donation af eggs fcr assisted reprzdurtien by another
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still be found to be the legal father if he and the mother, during the first
two years of the child's life, resided together in the same household with
292the child and openly held out the child as their own.
These amendments allow the intended father of a nonmarital ART
child to be established as the child's legal father, whether he provided his
own sperm for assisted reproduction or whether the child was conceived
293using donor sperm. Unfortunately, amended § 703 was not particularly
well-drafted, and it is unclear how the provision should be interpreted
with respect to consent. The provision is clear that a man who intends to
be the father of a nonmarital ART child conceived with donor sperm
must sign a written consent294 pursuant to § 704.295 But the provision is
not clear as to whether a man who provides his own sperm for assisted
reproduction by his partner must also sign a written consent: does the
"or" between "provides sperm for" and "consents to" sever the connec-
tion between providing sperm and signing a written consent pursuant to
§ 704?296
Under a literal interpretation of § 703, a man who failed to sign a
written consent could not be established as the legal father of his biologi-
cal, intended nonmarital ART child unless he and the mother had lived
together in the same household during the first two years of the child's
297life and held out the child as their own.
Thus, even under the amended statute, in the factual scenario of
J.MK., a court could not likely establish that KepI was the legal father of
his second son, David. Kepl never signed any kind of written consent or
(b) Failure etfthe hishand a man to sign a consent required by subsection (a),
before or after birth of the child, does not preclude a finding of paternity d1
the h-hand Ir the father Afa phild bern tR hiz ,ife if the woman vife and the
man, during the first two years of the child's life resided together in the same
household with the child and husba-nd openly treated held out the child as their
own.
Amendments to the UPA, supra note 281, at 24.
292. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b), 9B U.L.A. 40-41 (Supp. 2005).
293. See id. §§ 703-704.
294. The "consent" does not require any specific form or affidavit; it simply "must be in a
record signed by the woman and the man." Id. § 704(a).
295. See id. §§ 703, 704(a). Situations involving intended nonbiological fathers who fail to sign
a written consent would thus be left to the common law. See discussion supra note 271.
296. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, 9B U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2005) (reproduced supra note
290). The Comment to § 703 provides some indication that the Drafting Committee may not have
intended for the statute to require written consent by a man providing his own sperm for assisted
reproduction if he intends to be the parent of the resulting child: "The father-child relationship is
created by a man and the resulting child if the man provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted re-
production by a woman with the intent to be the parent of her child." Id. § 703 cmt. (emphasis
added).
297. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703, 704(b).
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paternity acknowledgement for David.298 In addition, although he appar-
ently visited both children, 299 he never lived in the same house as
Brock,300 and he kept his second family a secret from most people. 30 1
Even if Kepl had lived together with Brock and held David out to be his
own child, their relationship ended when David was only a few months
old.302 Therefore, despite the fact that it was apparently Kepl's idea to
have a second child in the first place, that he gave Brock $700 to help
pay for the in vitro fertilization procedure, and despite the existence of
numerous family photographs and a family album that corroborated his
original intent to be David's parent, 30 3 a court would be unable to hold
that Kepl was David's legal father under §§ 703 and 704.304
This result is troubling because, had Kepl and Brock conceived
David through sexual intercourse, there is no question that Kepl would
be obligated as David's legal father to support him.30 5 Thus, the only rea-
son Kepl could not be established as David's legal father, due to the op-
eration of §§ 703 and 704 is because Kepl and Brock were unsuccessful
in their attempts to conceive naturally and were forced to resort to as-
sisted reproductive technology. 30 6 In the Illinois Supreme Court case, In
re Parentage of MJ., the court identified what is so troubling about the
inability to establish the legal paternity of someone like Kepl:
If an unmarried man who biologically causes conception through
sexual relations without the premeditated intent of birth is legally
obligated to support a child, then the equivalent resulting birth of a
child caused by the deliberate conduct of artificial insemination
298. In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 391, 119 P.3d 840, 848-49
(2005).
299. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 4, J.MK., 155 Wash. 2d 374 (2005) (No. 75563-9).
300. See J.M.K., 155 Wash.2d at 377-81, 119 P.3d at 841-44.
301. Id. at 379, 381, 119 P.3d at 842-43.
302. Id. at 380-81, 119 P.3d at 843.
303. Id. at 380, 119 P.3d at 843; Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at app. C, J.MK., 155 Wash.
2d 374 (2005) (No. 75563-9).
304. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703-704.
305. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.405 (2004) (providing, in part, that genetic testing shall be
ordered if a request for genetic testing is supported by a sworn statement alleging paternity and
stating facts establishing a reasonable probability of the requisite sexual contact); id. § 26.26.600(2)
(providing, in part, that genetic tests identifying the man as the father requires the man to be adjudi-
cated the father); Hammack v. Hammack, 114 Wash. App. 805, 808, 60 P.3d 663, 665 (2004) (par-
ents have no right to waive their children's right to support; such agreements are void as against
public policy); State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 814-15, 498 P.2d 877, 881 (1972) (agreement
between parents of nonmarital child regarding child support cannot be used to avoid obligation of
child support); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 38 Wash. App. 288, 297, 687 P.2d 223, 227 (1984) (father has
duty to support nonmarital child conceived through sexual intercourse even if tricked into believing
that the mother could not get pregnant).
306. See In re Parentage of J.M.K. and D.R.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 378, 119 P.3d 840, 842
(2005); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703-704.
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should receive the same treatment in the eyes of the law. Regardless
of the method of conception, a child is born in need of support. 307
One solution to the problem would be to modify the language of
§ 703 as follows:
A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduc-
tion by a woman as provided in Sectionm 704 with the intent to be the
parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.
This formulation would not require a man who provides sperm for
the assisted reproduction of his partner to sign a consent. Written consent
would still be required, however, for a man to be established as the legal
father of a child conceived through the use of donor sperm. 308 This
distinction is justified because the act of providing sperm for assisted
reproduction, in the context of known donors,30 9 provides at least some
indicia of intent to be a parent. However, merely providing sperm for
assisted reproduction would not be enough to satisfy the element of in-
tent-some further evidence of intent to be a parent would be required.
This statutory formulation would also promote the public policy of
assigning parental liability to biological parents in all but the most
meritorious situations (i.e., situations where gamete donors have con-
sented in writing to the termination of their parental rights) and would
prevent the burden of supporting nonmarital ART children from falling
upon taxpayers.
Even if the legislature were to adopt § 703 as promulgated by
NCCUSL, 310 however, the amendment would be an enormous improve-
ment upon current RCW 26.26.7 10."' This is because, in the absence of
written consent to be a parent, the act of living together in the same
house as the child and holding the child out as one's own is an
appropriate (although imperfect) proxy for intent to be a parent.312 The
provision would not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it does
not contain a classification based upon the marital status of the ART
child's parents.
313
307. 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (111. 2003) (emphasis added).
308. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703, 704(a), 9B U.L.A. 40-41 (Supp. 2005).
309. The statute would not impose parental liability upon men who donate anonymously at
sperm banks because the act of anonymous donation clearly indicates intent not to be a parent.
310. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, 9B U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2005) (reproduced supra note
290).
311. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.710 (2004); see discussion supra note 288.
312. See discussion supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text.
313. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, 9B U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2005); see also discussion supra
Part III.F.I.
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V. CONCLUSION
There was a time in the history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence
when an illegitimate child was a total outcast, without a right to
support from either its mother or father. In later common law,
the duty of the support of such a child was entirely upon the
mother. Now, almost universally, the father is given a share of
this responsibility by statute. In keeping with this enlightened
change of concept as to the status and rights of an illegitimate
child, we are not disposed to treat the illegitimate child so differ-
ently from the legitimate child caught in the backwash of his
parents' separation. In all sense of justice and equity, any such
distinction, at least as to the right of parental support, belongs to
a bygone day.3 4
The WPA has not stayed true to the former WPA's original purpose
of providing substantive legal equality to marital and nonmarital
children, and it represents a step backward for the rights of nonmarital
children. First, the WPA removes previously existing statutory protection
for nonmarital children who have established long-term parent-child rela-
tionships with non-biological fathers. Second, as seen by applying the
facts of J.MK. to the current statutory scheme, the WPA discriminates
against nonmarital ART children on the basis of their parents' marital
status. The disparate treatment of marital and nonmarital ART children is
not only bad public policy, it is unconstitutional. Washington should
amend the WPA in order to protect the constitutional rights of nonmarital
ART children and to better promote the public policies of parental ac-
countability and child-welfare. By adopting the UPA (2002) amend-
ments-whether as written or in a slightly modified form-the legisla-
ture would be taking a much needed step towards restoring the rights of
nonmarital children and returning discrimination based on "illegitimacy"
to the bygone day where it belongs.
314. State v. Coffey, 77 Wash. 2d 630, 634-35, 465 P.2d 665, 667-68 (1970) (emphasis
added).
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